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Assessing the Issue of Arbitrariness in Capital Sentencing in North Carolina: 
 
Are the Effects of Legally Relevant Variables Racially Invariant? 
 
Judith Kavanaugh Earl 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyzed case and sentencing data from 632 capital cases involving 
Black and White defendants and victims, processed in North Carolina from May 1990 
through December 2002.  Logistic regression analysis of all cases and race-specific data 
allowed assessment of the variable effects of jury acceptance of statutory aggravating and 
mitigating factors on capital sentencing outcomes (death versus life).  The purpose was to 
evaluate the role race plays in shaping jury use of legally defined factors in capital 
sentencing.  Significant variance in the effect of jury acceptance of aggravators was 
observed between Black and White defendants.  Black defendants pay a higher premium 
in terms of the risk of a death sentence than do White defendants whose crimes are 
comparably aggravated.  There was no overall disparity in the effect of jury acceptance of 
mitigatory factors observed, although certain mitigators reduced the risk of a death 
sentence significantly more for Black or White.  Overall, the aggravators had a 
statistically significantly stronger effect on sentencing outcomes than did the mitigators, 
regardless of race, and on cases involving Black defendants, regardless of victim race.  
Racial invariance was not shown. 
 iv
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one 
defendant is "unusual" if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, 
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a 
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), DOUGLAS, J., concurring. 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the ‘guided 
discretion’ approach to death sentencing under the seminal holding in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238(1972) has achieved racial neutrality in the life-death decision. 
This is accomplished through statistical analysis assessing the presence or lack of racial 
invariance in capital jury application of the North Carolina capital sentencing statute from 
1990 to 2002.   The secondary goal of the paper is to explore the viability of statistical 
analyses as proof of nonpurposeful racial discrimination, which is potentially actionable 
as violative of constitutional principles requiring evenhanded punishment, jury 
impartiality and substantive due process.   
To frame the empirical issues, it is necessary first to understand three pivotal 
United States Supreme Court decisions: 1) Furman v. Georgia, 1972 (prohibited 
standardless death sentencing; commuted all pending sentences to life and placed 
moratorium on further death sentencing); 2) the combined holdings in Gregg v. Georgia 
(1976), Proffitt v. Florida (1976) and Jurek v. Texas(1976) (established the two-pronged 
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‘guided discretion’ paradigm for death sentencing); and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 
(rejected statistical showing of group-based racial disparity as evidence of purposeful 
discrimination against an individual defendant; established undefined ‘constitutional 
significance’ standard for statistical showing of Eighth Amendment arbitrariness in 
operation of Furman-compliant sentencing procedures).  
Furman v. Georgia (1972): The Eighth Amendment Argument  
Ground zero for current capital punishment jurisprudence is the landmark case of 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman the Supreme Court rejected the 
unlimited discretion previously afforded capital juries in making the life-death decision 
as violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive, cruel and unusual 
punishment.  This approach to the life-death sentencing choice was based on a new 
interpretation of what may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Only a year before Furman, in McGautha v. California (1971) and its 
consolidated companion case, Crampton v. Ohio (1971), the Court had rejected Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of procedural due process arguments against capital 
sentencing procedures which employed a single jury for guilt and sentencing and allowed 
standardless jury discretion under the California and Ohio capital sentencing statutes, 
finding the procedures adequate and fair within the meaning of those two constitutional 
provisions and that the exercise of  discretion is essential to the sentencing process.    
In Furman, the Court was presented with the different question of the 
constitutionality of standardless death sentencing discretion under the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of excessive, cruel or unusual punishment, regardless of the 
procedural fairness surrounding the decision.  This time a majority of the Court found 
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that, although unbridled jury discretion may be exercised in a way which meets 
procedural due process requirements, the lack of meaningful standards for deciding when 
a death sentence is appropriate amounts to unacceptable arbitrariness under the Eighth 
Amendment.  The lack of standards capable of producing consistent and predictable 
outcomes for the same crime was found to be excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment,  
“freakishly imposed,” in the words of Justice Stewart (Furman, Stewart, J. concurring).   
Among the reasons cited by the concurring plurality, and the dissenters as well, 
for distinguishing death sentencing was the acknowledgement that ‘death is different’ in 
its irrevocable finality; and although ‘traditional’ in our system, death is unique as the 
ultimate penalty and requires maximum care to ensure equitable and correct decisions 
(Furman, 1972).  The potential for racial discrimination in death sentencing was not an 
express basis for the Furman holding, but was specifically cited as one of the risks, if not 
certain result of absolute jury sentencing discretion by Justices Douglas, Brennan, 
Marshall, and acknowledged by dissenting Justices Burger and Powell.  Unlike other 
potentially legal and illegal bases for discriminatory governmental action, protection 
from racial discrimination finds its roots in our history and the Constitution itself; the          
Amendments were all enacted to end slavery and cure its ills by afford Black persons full 
citizenship and equal protection of our laws.  If ‘death is different’, so is race, and where 
racial disparity is demonstrated in operation of the law, it demands scrutiny by the courts 
for constitutional acceptability. 
It should also be noted that the dissenters did not express a belief that the death 
penalty as then administered was fair or color-blind, but stressed reluctance under 
principles of judicial restraint to interfere with what was seen as a state legislative 
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function, or to expand so broadly the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  In a 
foreshadowing of the controversy as to what constitutes proof of racial inequity in capital 
sentencing to be addressed fifteen years later in McCleskey, Justices Burger and Powell 
also questioned the degree to which the Court should rely on the statistical evidence cited 
by members of the plurality in support of their positions (Furman, 1972, BURGER, J. 
dissenting, at note 12; POWELL, J. dissenting).     
Then there was the question of remedy.  Among the concurring plurality, only 
Justices Brennan and Marshall pressed for absolute rejection of death as a penalty, a 
position both maintained until their deaths.  Justices Douglas, White and Stewart opted 
for rejection of the death penalty under then extant state statutes but did not rule out the 
possibility that a statute could be drawn which would limit jury sentencing discretion to 
impose death in constitutionally acceptable ways while preserving the jury’s ability to 
grant leniency in specific cases (Furman, 1972).  The result of Furman, then, was 
invalidation of existing state capital sentencing statutes, a moratorium on further 
imposition of the death penalty under such statutes, and commutation of all pending death 
sentences to life in prison (Furman, 1972).  Many believed, or at least hoped, that 
Furman effectively abolished death as a penalty in this country; but that turned out not to 
be the case (Radelet, 2001).   
Furman Implemented: Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek 
The state legislative response to Furman was immediate. Within four years, 
thirty-five (35) states had re-enacted capital sentencing statutes intended to incorporate 
the Furman principles, and five cases had made their way to the Supreme Court: Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 
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428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).   
Three of the states, Georgia, Florida and Texas, whose capital sentencing systems 
were brought before the Court in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, adopted procedures whereby 
the capital sentencing discretion was appropriately guided in a ‘guided discretion’ model 
as impliedly acceptable under Furman.  . The Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek holdings collectively 
represent the second stage – implementation – of the new death sentencing approach 
announced in Furman.   Each state statute provided two substantive, interacting criteria to 
be used by the sentencing entity to decide when the death penalty would be appropriate: 
1) standards defining and narrowing the class of crimes for which death could be 
considered -- the aggravating criteria; and 2) mandatory procedures allowing 
comprehensive consideration of individual mitigating factors which might justify mercy 
in a particular defendant’s case (Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek).   
Each state also provided an acceptable procedural framework for the application 
of these standards, in the form of bifurcated guilt-penalty proceedings, automatic and 
expedited appeal of all death sentences to the respective state supreme courts, and 
mandatory proportionality review.1  Although different in certain procedural respects, the 
three statutory schemes approved in Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek have provided the template for 
all state capital sentencing procedures today (Bowers & Foglia, 2003; Holowinski, 2002).   
 
1 This last procedure was made optional some ten years later in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 
(1983), based on the Court’s conclusion that efficient aggravation standards made proportionality review 
redundant.  Some states, notably New Jersey and Florida, have retained proportionality review as an extra 
procedural safeguard. 
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The two remaining states, North Carolina and Louisiana, whose statutes were 
reviewed in Woodson and Roberts, had also enacted procedures which significantly 
limited and clearly defined the crimes for which death was an available penalty, but made 
death mandatory for those few crimes, without allowing consideration of mitigatory 
factors.  The Court emphatically rejected this approach as inconsistent with Furman, 
holding that while the jury’s discretion to impose death must be limited, its discretion to 
grant life to individual defendants based on their unique situation could not (Woodson, 
1976).  The Furman approach thus dictates the narrowest of discretion to impose death, 
while at the same time affords the broadest discretion to grant life.  It is in the application 
of these principles that nonpurposeful racial bias may have the most play – when capital 
sentencing entities decide objectively whether a defendant’s crime deserves death, but 
subjectively whether the defendant himself deserves life.  
Fifteen years after Furman and a decade after its new take on the Eighth 
Amendment notion of punishment was implemented per Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, the 
Supreme Court was presented squarely with the question of whether Furman and its 
progeny had produced a sentencing procedure which was producing equitable death 
sentencing – not just among capital defendants generally but between Black and White 
defendants, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).   
Race Neutrality Under Furman: McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 
  McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is the third of the triumvirate of holdings which have 
shaped capital sentencing law for the thirty-odd years since Furman, and it continues to 
be the decision most affecting efforts to redress documented racial bias in the capital 
justice system.  Defendant McCleskey was an African-American convicted of the murder 
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of a White police officer and sentenced to death in Georgia.  He brought a habeas corpus 
proceeding seeking the overturn of his death sentence based on an assertion, that, despite 
meeting the Furman standards per Gregg, distortions in the application of the Georgia 
statute to Black citizens, reflected a racial bias infecting the Georgia capital justice 
system which 1) violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and 2) resulted in sentencing arbitrariness as to him which violated the Eighth 
Amendment under Furman.   No direct evidence of bias against McCleskey personally 
was claimed or shown.   
Denial of McCleskey’s equal protection claim. 
In asserting that his death sentence was a denial of equal protection, McCleskey 
relied on a theory of disparate impact between Black and White defendants and victims 
from application of Georgia’s capital justice procedures, which was supported by a 
comprehensive statistical study of the Georgia system (the Georgia Study) by Professor 
David Baldus and his colleagues (Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, 1990).  The study used 
modern logistic regression methodologies like those previously accepted by the Court to 
prove implied purposeful discrimination based on disparate impact in other non-
sentencing situations, such as Title VII employment and housing discrimination cases and 
jury venire selection (McCleskey, 1987).    
McCleskey asserted that the Georgia Study established both an increased risk of a 
death sentence for Black defendants over White defendants who had committed 
comparable crimes, and for those who killed White victims, indicating an overall 
devaluation of Black citizens.  The study, he argued, showed that the statute as applied 
placed Black capital defendants such as McCleskey at an unfair and arbitrary, higher risk 
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of receiving a death penalty than White defendants committing comparable crimes which 
denied him equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and subjected him to 
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.  The real issue was what level and type 
of proof would sustain a denial of equal protection claim based on disparate impact, or an 
Eighth Amendment arbitrariness claim in a capital sentencing case:  “This case presents 
the question whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial 
considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner 
McCleskey’s capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (McCleskey, 1987).   
It must be stressed that McCleskey was not challenging the Georgia statute 
directly; his claim sought to overturn his individual sentence.  While the overturn of his 
sentence on a disparate impact basis may have set precedent applicable to other members 
of the affected group – Black defendants sentenced to death – the relief he sought was 
specific to him and this distinction between individual and general remedies is important 
to understanding the holding in McCleskey (Graines, 2000).   
There is an intent element in an equal protection claim which requires proof of 
purposeful discrimination against an individual or a group to trigger the strictest judicial 
scrutiny racial classification requires (Washington v. Davis (1976)).  The purpose to 
discriminate may be either express – disparate treatment – or inferred from informed 
tolerance of differences in the impact of facially neutral governmental action on a group.  
The inference requires a disparity in effect so significant as to imply an intent of adverse 
effect on the group and its individual members – that is, disparate impact discrimination 
is actionable only where it is so significant as to support an inference that “… the 
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decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action ‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon the identifiable group.” (Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 1979).  Unconscious, but palpable, 
discrimination is not actionable as a denial of equal protection (McCleskey, 1987; 
Lawrence (1987)). 
The McCleskey court denied his equal protection claim, holding that the broad 
discretion inherent in capital sentencing and the myriad of factors which inform that 
discretion in a jury capital sentencing decision in an individual case prevents use of 
statistical proof of general racial disparities as sole proof of actionable purposeful racial 
discrimination, within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, in imposing the death 
sentence in an individual case.   
The Court relied on it prior decisions holding that statistical or other evidence of 
disproportionate negative impact of governmental action on one group over another is not 
enough, standing alone, to support a finding of discriminatory intent (Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977)) except where the pattern of  disparity is 
“stark”, citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) [redistricting to exclude 395 of 400 Black 
voters – a 99% disparity] and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) [requiring permits for 310 
laundries in wooden houses, but declining to issue permits for any of the 200 Chinese-
owned laundries – 100% disparity].   
In rejecting the use of the proffered statistical proof in McCleskey’s case, the 
Court also noted flexibility in its willingness to consider statistical proof of 
discriminatory intent in Title VII  cases and particularly distinguished its acceptance of 
statistical proof in jury venire cases (Castaneda v. Partida (1977)[2-1 disparity between 
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Hispanic population and grand jury composition]; Whitus v. Georgia (1967)[3-1 disparity 
between Black population and grand jury composition]; (Turner v. Fouche (1970)[1.6 
disparity between Black population and grand jury composition], but based this 
distinction on the level of discretion and number of decisionmakers involved in the 
allegedly discriminatory action.   
The Court held that the more decisionmakers, the more factors affecting the 
decision, and the larger the number of decisions affecting the group from which the 
plaintiff seeks to infer discrimination in his individual case, the further his claimed harm 
is causally from the challenged action and the less acceptable statistics become as sole 
proof of intent to discriminate (McCleskey, 1987).  The Court held that “an application of 
an inference drawn from general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing 
[context] simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from …”  
these other contexts where the discretion was more defined and exercised by fewer 
people (McCleskey, 1987).   
The McCleskey Court acknowledged the potential for racial bias skewing capital 
trial and sentencing decisions, but saw it as the inevitable consequence of the jury system 
and the broad discretion it requires.  The Court noted the framework of  procedural 
safeguards it had constructed by then to keep racial bias below as yet undefined 
‘constitutionally acceptable’ levels at other discretionary decision points in the process 
(Batson v. Kentucky (1986)[systematic prosecutorial strikes of Black jurors, or 
demonstration of venire disproportionate to minority population is prima facie proof of 
discriminatory intent for equal protection purposes, shifting burden to prosecutor to 
provide race-neutral explanation for exclusion]; Irvin v. Dowd (1961)[widespread racial 
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bias can require change in venue]; Ristaino v. Ross (1976)[significant likelihood of racial 
biasing influence requires questioning of jurors about racial attitudes]; Turner v. Murray 
(1986) [high potential for racism biasing jurors in Black-on-White murder requires voir 
dire re racial opinions under Sixth Amendment jury impartiality guarantee] and that effort 
to perfect procedural fairness continues today (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)) 
[prosecutorial intent to discriminate racially in jury selection within meaning of Equal 
Protection Clause in jury selection may be inferred from practices such as venire 
‘shuffling’ and disparate questioning of White and Black jury candidates].    
It is reasonable to conclude that McCleskey absolutely forecloses the use of 
statistical evidence of group disparities as sole, competent proof of purposeful denial of 
equal protection in individual capital sentences; at a minimum it expressly held that 
something more than the ‘mere correlation’ between race and death sentencing the Court 
found the Georgia Study produced is necessary (McCleskey, 1987).  No case has 
attempted to rely on an equal protection argument proffering solely statistical proof in a 
sentencing context post-McCleskey (Pillai, 2001), and it is questionable whether such a 
claim could be sustained as to any criminal sentence (Kennedy, 1988).  Perhaps 
McCleskey would allow an equal protection claim in a sentencing case, were the 
statistically demonstrated disparity were sufficiently stark, or a different individual or 
class-based remedy for denial of equal protection pursued which would allow use of 
statistical to show racial discrimination in capital sentencing (Graines, 2000).  In light of 
the empirical studies to date, such a stark disparity is unlikely to be found, and continued 
focus on equal protection theories begs the question of whether the cause of the disparity 
is actually the result of purposeful discrimination – a required element of an equal 
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protection claim – or may be caused by nonpurposeful racial bias perhaps violative of 
other constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, also addressed in 
McCleskey.  
McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim. 
Having rejected McCleskey’s equal protection claim as unproven, the Court next 
looked at the sufficiency of the Georgia Study to demonstrate arbitrariness in 
McCleskey’s sentencing result, violative of the Eighth Amendment under Furman.  The 
Court accepted the Georgia Study as valid for purposes of the Eighth Amendment claim 
as it had for the equal protection claim, but where it may rejected the Georgia Study more 
as being incompetent to sustain an inference of discriminatory intent in a sentencing 
context, it rejected it in the Eighth Amendment context as being insufficient to document 
a racial bias strong enough to rise beyond constitutionally acceptable levels, holding the 
disparity demonstrated in the study lacked the ‘constitutional significance’ to be arbitrary 
or capricious within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.   
The Court noted that McCleskey could not say his death sentence was 
disproportional to his crime, as it involved aggravating circumstances the Georgia statute 
had defined in sufficiently precise terms to qualify it for the death penalty.  Nor could he 
say that the Georgia statute was defective in allowing the jury broad discretion to 
considering mitigatory factors when deciding life or death in his or any other case, since 
it had been upheld already in Gregg, no racial bias had been asserted in its application to 
him personally, and Woodson required jury discretion in sentencing.  The only possible 
basis for an Eighth Amendment claim was showing constitutionally significant disparity 
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– and this is the puzzle the McCleskey decision poses:  What level of racial prejudice 
must be shown to trigger constitutional significance?   
Without explaining what level it might have found constitutionally unacceptable, 
the McCleskey court took more of a ‘we’ll-know-it-when-we-see-it’ approach, and did 
not see it in McCleskey’s case.  The Court noted that the jury is the criminal defendant’s 
“fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice (McCleskey 
(1987), citing Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)) and that the purpose of requiring that the 
composition of a capital sentencing jury reflect the criminal’s community is to assure 
‘diffused impartiality (citing Taylor v. Louisiana (1975)).  The Court acknowledged 
again that individual jurors bring to the sentencing decision their personal attitudes, 
experience and other qualities which cannot be reduced to range of factors to which 
legislation can apply.  Still, the Court rejected any argument that the broad discretion to 
be lenient is per se constitutionally unacceptable, and confirmed that the broad discretion 
for mercy is absolutely essential to the capital sentencing decision provided it is exercised 
in the facially fairest possible setting. 
Having accepted that McCleskey’s sentence was proportional and the result of 
scrupulously fair procedures for the exercise of the sentencing discretion, but agreeing 
that racial prejudice is always a risk in sentencing situation, the Court examined the 
Georgia Study to determine “exactly” what it showed and whether it rose to the level of 
constitutional significance requiring further inquiry.  The Court relied heavily on the trial 
court’s analysis of the study, which had resulted in a rejection of the findings as flawed 
by problems with the methodology, such as sample size and selection, coding problems, 
variable selection and missing data:  “’It is a major premise of a statistical case that the 
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data mirrors reality.  If it does not in substantial degree mirror reality, any inferences 
empirically arrived at are untrustworthy’” (McCleskey, at footnotes 5-7).  The Supreme 
Court elected to accept the study as valid, as had the appellate court, but held that the 
results did not rise to constitutional significance within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment.   
The Court focused on two points: 1) logistic regression analysis quantifies only 
the degree to which the risk of the outcome occurring is increased or decreased by the 
factor analyzed and the study failed to produce statistically significant racial disparities in 
the risks of a death sentence; and 2) the instability and lack of predictive efficiency in the 
models used, as evidenced by low R2 values, weaken the validity of any inference of 
constitutionally unacceptable race-based sentencing disparities.   
The unadjusted data showed a notable race-of-victim effect (11% of White victim 
cases resulting in a death sentence versus 1% of Black victim cases) and a slight, reversed 
race-of-defendant effect (4% Black defendants versus 7% White defendants with death 
sentence).  When the data was subjected to logistic regression analysis, the only racial 
effect demonstrated was a significant increase [a multiplier of 4.3] in the risk of any 
defendant receiving the death penalty if his victim was White, but a Black defendant was 
almost as likely to receive a death sentence as a White defendant, his risk being only 1.1 
times higher.  The highest fit was for a 230-variable model which attempted to 
incorporate all possible influences on a capital sentencing decision, with an R2 of 
“between .46 and .48”, meaning it predicted the sentencing outcome in less than 50% of 
the cases (McCleskey at footnote 6).    
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Thus it can be concluded that 4.3 multiplier of the risk of death sentencing, at 
least based on the race of a victim, was not significant enough in the eyes of the 
McClesky court to be constitutionally significant for Eighth Amendment purposes.  It can 
also be concluded that logistic regression models with a predictive value of less than 50% 
are not sufficiently predictive to relay on their results for a finding of constitutionally 
unacceptable levels of race bias in a capital sentencing context.  What higher disparities 
and predictive efficiencies might trigger the Eighth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment 
protections against ‘constitutionally significant’ racial bias are unknown, but the levels 
shown in McCleskey were not enough. 
No case has since reached the Court relying solely on statistical evidence for a 
challenge to the death penalty.  Unfortunately, despite three decades of fine-tuning these 
models and the construction of a complex system of ‘super due process’ safeguards 
around them, the empirical research still finds significant unexplained disparities between 
Black and White citizens in the administration of capital justice. (Baldus & Woodworth, 
2004; Bowers & Foglia, 2003; Howe, 2004).  What remains in dispute is whether this 
research is sufficient to raise constitutional red flags as to the continued legality of the 
death penalty. It is also likely that any significant disparity found is not intentional, but 
the result of unconscious racial attitudes, in light of the continued integration of society. 
Latent Racism versus Blatant Racism 
Open racism is no longer politically correct, and it can fairly be said that Furman 
and its progeny have largely eliminated purposeful racism from death sentencing (Howe, 
2004), although it may still exist in certain, defined geographic areas (Baldus & 
Woodworth, 2003; Paternoster & Brame, 2003).  Many argue that latent racism still 
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infects capital justice, not in the form of open prejudice, but as the cultural relic of three 
centuries of slavery and Jim Crow (Howe, 2004; Lawrence, 1987).  The McCleskey court 
acknowledged that race-based sentencing disparities exist, citing various studies and 
noting Congress’ development of sentencing guidelines for criminal cases to reduce 
unguided discretion arising out of individual predispositions not just in capital cases but 
in all criminal cases (McCleskey at footnotes 35, 38), while at the same time accepting 
some level of racism as an unavoidable by-product of the jury system. 
As we have moved further from the 1970’s, and the civil rights movement has 
cooled from confrontation to implementation of the laws intended to cure racial 
discrimination, the nature of racism has changed.  Critical race theorists maintain that 
although open racism has dwindled, latent racism is still a pernicious and pervasive 
negative force in society (Lynch & Patterson, 1996).  The source of latent racism is a 
topic for theoretical debate with the so-called ‘idealists’, who have most affected the legal 
system in this country, viewing racism as attitudinal – and thus capable of change over 
time as the law forces social change and acceptance of disparate groups (Lawrence, 
1987).  The ‘realists’ among post-modern theorists view racism as the product of the 
continuing struggle between the classes in a capitalist society, with those in power always 
consciously and unconsciously acting to maintain their status and suppress those below 
by keeping them in their place (Delgado, 2001).  Both sides agree that racism, both latent 
and blatant, is still an active force in our culture. 
Intentional racism is relatively easy to eliminate because it is the result of 
conscious personal choices and thus can be addressed through education and the threat of 
legal consequences. Latent racism is unintentional and nonpurposeful; it just happens as 
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part of the social, cultural, geographical, religious and even political conditioning which 
occurs in development of individual personalities and attitudes (Lawrence, 1988; 
Lenhardt, 2004).  It thus is not subject to traditional legal remedies applicable to 
intentional, purposeful conduct, such as equal protection claims, and can only be cured by 
time and proximity to the object of the unconscious negative attitudes.   
To fear those of a different race and thus different from one’s self is human, 
apparently a learned survival reaction which can be unlearned through proximity (Öhme, 
2005). The unconscious attribution of negative traits to Black persons may occur among 
White capital jurors who still make up the majority of juries, despite even the most 
conscientious effort at intellectual racial neutrality because the trial and sentencing 
experience is filtered through each individual jurors viewpoint, life experience and 
attitudes, including racial attitudes of both Black and White jurors (King, 1993; 
Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, 2001).   
Other factors which affect jury decision making are internal to the process itself, a 
process in which many capital jurors misunderstand their role so that their decision may 
be premature, arise out of incomprehension of the instructions given, or an erroneous 
belief that a guilty decision requires the death penalty or that a life decision may result in 
release of the defendant, and so on (Bowers & Foglia, 2002; Foglia, 2003).  The effect of 
these factors will also interact with racial attitudes, although none of these factors can be 
attributed to a conscious desire to discriminate against a defendant based on his race.  All 
can be attributed to individual juror characteristics, including unconscious racial bias, 
which cannot be standardized by additional due process but may still significantly 
undermine the fairness of the sentencing process. 
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The difficulty lies in detecting and quantifying unconscious and thus 
nonpurposeful racism in order to determine the degree to which it may affect capital 
sentencing decisions under Furman.  To date the issue of nonpurposeful discrimination 
resulting in racially variance in capital sentencing has not been raised before the Supreme 
Court. If such bias exists there are no directly applicable legal standards to cure it.   
The primary empirical objective of this study was to detect and measure racial 
variance in application of the Furman standards as embodied in a Furman-compliant 
state capital sentencing law, in this case, that of North Carolina.  Evidence that the 
apparently neutral application of the Furman-based, legally relevant sentencing standards 
– the aggravating and mitigating circumstances accepted by a capital jury – to similarly 
situated defendants -- is not racially invariant casts doubt on the legality – and the 
morality -- of continuing to use the Furman model to send defendants to their death more 
because of their race than their crime.  A finding of racial variance may indicate, as 
Justice Blackmon concluded towards the end of his life2, that the Furman experiment has 
failed, and that the Constitution demands a different approach to punishment of the most 
serious crimes.  It may also be indicative of latent nonpurposeful racism still skewing the 
process which cannot be addressed by additional procedural fix-its.  The results provide a 
basis for alternative constitutional arguments under which the Supreme Court may be 
willing to consider supporting statistical evidence in evaluating the racial disparity in 
 
2 As one of his last acts on the Court, Justice Blackmun receded completely from his position in Furman 
and voted to abolish the death penalty:  “Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the 
desired level of fairness has been reached … I feel morally and intellectually obligated to concede that the 
death penalty experiment has failed.” ( Callins v. Collins (1994), BLACKMUN, J. dissenting). 
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capital sentencing procedures and find such disparities constitutionally unacceptable and 
repugnant to fundamental concepts of racial equity.   
This introductory chapter has outlined in the broadest terms the legal setting for 
the discussion.  Chapter Two presents a more detailed summary of the constitutional and 
legal issues at play in death sentencing and the effect of the McCleskey decision on the 
use of statistical analyses to prove racial disparities.  Chapter Three provides an overview 
of the extant empirical studies on the influence of race on capital justice in this country 
and defines the research problem presented and the hypotheses tested.  Chapter Four 
describes the North Carolina data and the logistic regression methodology used.  Chapter 
Five presents the results of the logistic regression analyses performed.  Finally, Chapter 
Six discusses the results and draws conclusions as to the meaning and possible use of the 
findings in the continuing effort to maximize race-blind decision-making in capital 
sentencing.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Legal Overview 
 
Chapter One explained the import of Furman, Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek and 
McCleskey on the continued use of the death penalty in this country, despite the potential 
for race-based disparity.  It is important to note several things about these cases. First, 
they are all capital sentencing cases and do not apply directly to the other discretionary 
decisions which lead a defendant to the life-death decision and might be racially-biased. 
Thus studies showing racial bias at the prosecutorial decisions may inform these 
sentencing  holdings, and vice-versa, but are not directly on point insofar as their legal 
reasoning.    
Secondly, although McCleskey held that only purposeful discrimination may be 
redressed under equal protection principles and rejected the use of statistical proof to 
imply intent, it did not require intent to discriminate in an Eighth Amendment context, 
nor did Furman or Gregg.  Rather the question posed – and left unanswered -- was what 
level of racial disparity would be constitutionally significant.  Thirdly, no case has yet 
decided what level of statistically demonstrated race-based disparity in capital sentencing 
would trigger constitutional protections under doctrines other than equal protection, 
although McCleskey provided guidance as to what won’t. 
 The final major issue raised by these cases is the choice of remedy.  For example, 
McCleskey was a habeas corpus proceeding seeking to overturn a specific defendant’s 
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sentence as a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, where Furman 
and Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek sought to answer the broader legal question as to whether the 
death penalty statutes then administered in Texas and Georgia – and echoed in other 
capital states – resulted in cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  
While all of these cases sought specific relief from death sentences, relief in McCleskey’s 
case would have been specific to him – that his particular sentence was unconstitutional -
- and involved a very individual burden of proof of purposeful harm to him as an 
individual notwithstanding the fact that his success would have effectively invalidated the 
Georgia statute.  Furman and Gregg were appeals of state supreme court decisions, 
petitions for writ of certiorari seeking the answer to broad legal questions of general 
applicability, and thus affected directly all death sentences reached prior to their holdings. 
 The choice of remedy affects the burden of proof and the weight accorded the 
statistical evidence.  A habeas proceeding is an original proceeding, and the Court is not 
limited to the record and legal questions as in certiorari proceedings, but the burden of 
proof is heavier.  McCleskey applied habeas corpus evidentiary standards [‘exceptional’,’ 
clear and convincing’ proof] to an individual equal protection and Eighth Amendment 
claim seeking individual relief.  Because of the uncertainty in any statistical analysis and 
the fact this McCleskey’s claim was supported only by statistical proof implying the 
necessary discriminatory purpose and arbitrariness, he simply did not meet his burden of 
showing purposeful discrimination.  Had he raised claims in a proceeding with a lesser 
evidentiary requirement, or which did not have an intent element, or had the statistics 
been stronger, he may have fared better and certainly would have a lower bar to jump. 
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Racial disparity, be it intentional or not, which skews so irrevocable a decision as 
the life-death decision in a capital case, raises a Constitutional alarm to which the court 
must at some point respond.  Since the only way to prove systemic bias is through 
statistical studies – which are by definition only estimates, not absolute fact -- McCleskey 
seems to have eliminated equal protection as a basis for challenging racially disparate 
capital sentencing by requiring a showing of racially discriminatory intent.  Whether any 
statistically proven level of substantive latent racism in the capital justice system is or is 
not acceptable under our Constitution is beyond the scope of this analysis, except to 
frame the issues and suggest possible alternative legal vehicles to resolve them in the 
courts – but there are arguments to be made. 
Alternative Constitutional Principles 
There are four constitutional provisions pertinent to the issue of significant racial 
disparity in application of the death penalty.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee substantive and procedural due process of law before any governmental 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.  It has been argued that substantive due process 
requires racial equity in capital sentencing (Bird, 2003) and it would seem fundamental 
that the Constitution would abhor – as a matter of substance over form --  a demonstrably 
racially inequitable result of application of a law, regardless of how procedurally perfect 
it may be.   
As to Sixth and Eighth Amendment concerns, the Court has already indicated that 
some level of racial disparity in capital sentencing outcomes is unavoidable, but at an as 
yet undefined point such disparity may reach levels unacceptable under Sixth 
Amendment guarantees of trial and sentencing impartiality or amount to arbitrary and 
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capricious action violative of the Eighth Amendment.  The Court has already expressly 
acknowledged that Black-on-White crime poses the greatest risk for play of racial 
prejudice (Turner (1986); McCleskey (1987)).  Statistical analysis is the only means to 
measure racial disparity – inter- or intra-racial -- when looking at the overall, long term 
operation of a statute As discussed in Chapter One, there is no guideline beyond the 
Court’s consideration of the Eighth Amendment argument in McCleskey as to what level 
of disparity would be unacceptable other than it should reach statistical significance and 
be the product of a better-than-50% predictive model which incorporates appropriate 
variables to allow reasonable comparison of similar levels of criminal culpability among 
the defendants.  Once a statistically significant disparity is demonstrated, these two 
constitutional protections are arguably triggered and thus may provide a basis to 
challenge the race-neutrality of a statute.  What the Court would make of such a disparity, 
or what degree of disparity might offend constitutional sensibilities is unknown.  As to 
the possibility of a substantive due process claim, several legal and proof obstacles would 
have to be surmounted, but such a claim may also be viable. 
Race-based Sentencing Disparity as Denial of Substantive Due Process 
Legal scholars have argued that substantive due process principles might sustain 
for a challenge to the death penalty because of the higher, strict scrutiny the Court must 
afford to claimed deprivations of ‘fundamental’ rights (Bedau, 1996; Bird, 2003) and the 
heavier burden placed on the state to show a compelling interest which cannot be 
protected through other means other than the discriminatory action which also must be 
shown to be tailored as narrowly as possible to do so.  Once the claimant demonstrates 
the existence of the ‘fundamental right’ – a legal question -- and the fact that it is being in 
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some way infringed upon by the state action in question – a mixed question of law and 
fact -- the primary burden of proof and persuasion shifts to the state.  The viability of a 
substantive due process claim based on racial disparity has yet to be explored by the 
Court in a death penalty case, primarily because other constitutional protections have 
been available to redress racial discrimination in the past.  If, however, none of the other 
constitutional provisions are adequate to support a claim, because of proof or procedural 
issues peculiar to a capital sentencing situation, a substantive due process claim might 
suffice.   
Substantive due process is a judicially created doctrine which holds that in 
addition to the rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution, certain rights are so 
fundamental to life and liberty that they are inherently protected by the Constitution 
despite the lack of guidance from the more specific provisions of the Constitution 
(Crump, 1996).  No ‘fundamental’ right to life has yet been fully recognized by the Court 
(Bird, 2003).  Most of the cases touching on this issue have been based in fundamental 
liberty interests, such as the right to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut (1967) 
[establishing a woman’s privacy right to birth control]; Roe v. Wade (1973) [woman’s 
privacy right to chose whether to be pregnant or not]; Washington v. Glucksburg 
(1997)[no privacy right to die, even for terminally ill patients  Other liberty interests 
recognized by the court are freedom of unwarranted governmental infringement of 
personal movement (County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998)) and travel (Kent v. 
Dulles(1958)), and bodily integrity (Rochin v. California (1952)).  The right to life has 
been discussed in the context of excessive force cases which resulted in death, from a 
police chase, and the Court has said it requires “something more than negligence and less 
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than intent to harm (County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 1998).  There is also a murky 
question of what, if any, substantive due process rights exist in constitutionally fair 
procedures.  In Albright v. Olivier, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), the Court held that there was no 
substantive due process liberty interest in the prosecutorial charging decision being based 
on probable cause in a case where a defendant was arrested and charged, but later 
released by the court upon a finding of no probable cause for either.  A distinguishing 
factor, however, was that there had not been a “palpable” consequence to the defendant, 
who had turned himself in voluntarily (Albright, 1998).  Here the harm is palpable, finite 
and irreparable.  
 Although there is a certain optimism reflected in the legal literature about the 
viability of a fundamental ‘right to life’ in a challenge to the death penalty (Bird, 2003), it 
seems unrealistic in today’s political climate, and may be unnecessary.  An alternative 
and perhaps more politically palatable argument could be made that there is a 
fundamental liberty interest in a non-arbitrary, racially neutral capital sentencing, which 
is not protected by application of the Furman standards – that is, that liberty within the 
meaning of our law requires racial neutrality – or at least statistically significant equity -- 
in punishment.  What is the point of perfect procedural due process if the results are still 
markedly unfair, regardless of the lack of purposeful discrimination because the bias is 
culturally based, not consciously applied?  This would seem especially important when 
dealing with a protected classification such as race and a permanent and irrevocable loss 
of liberty and body.   
There is also a level of proof issue:  the Supreme Court has held that the 
governmental action asserted to violate due process must be “egregious” or “shock the 
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conscience” (County of Sacramento, 1997; Rochin, 1952).  Would continued execution of 
citizens in the face of documented and statistically significant racial disparity in the 
imposition of the death penalty shock the conscience?  The level of proof in a substantive 
due process claim would possibly have to be as ‘stark’ as the McCleskey court implied 
for Eighth Amendment arbitrariness – and if so, could be resolved under that provision.  
Another obstacle to pursuit of a substantive due process analysis is that the Court will not 
consider it if any other protection specifically afforded under the Constitution also applies 
(Graham v. Connor (1989)).  Substantive due process violations can be pled, but will not 
be addressed by the Court if any other constitutional principle is directly raised and 
applies.  To the extent, then, that the Sixth or Eighth Amendment arguments are raised 
and found to apply – regardless of whether the Court finds the action in question violates 
them – the substantive due process argument may never be reached.  The Graham court 
suggested, although it has not yet been conclusively held, that all post-conviction 
complaints about the death penalty as ‘excessive’ or ‘unjustified’ must be brought under 
the Eighth Amendment.  Since it is unknown whether either the Sixth or the Eighth 
Amendments can support a challenge to racial inequity in death sentencing caused by 
nonpurposeful racial bias proven with statistical studies, it is also unknown whether a 
substantive due process argument is available at all, but Graham seems to make it the 
argument of last resort. 
Remedies 
Finally, even where a constitutional violation can be shown, the choice of remedy 
will affect how the Supreme Court will interpret the Constitution in particular cases, as 
the McCleskey case shows.  This is particularly important when the only basis for the 
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claim of a constitutional violation is a statistical analysis producing general results as to a 
group which is being asserted as evidence of harm to an individual.  That is one reason 
why remedies such as habeas corpus and other appellate remedies seeking individual 
relief from a death sentence may not be the best vehicle to challenge an individual death 
sentence, as McCleskey demonstrated (Graines, 2000; Vetter, 2004).   
Habeas corpus [literally ‘let you have the body’] is an attack by a person in 
custody on the legality of his confinement, and is the appropriate remedy where a 
prisoner is attacking the fact or duration of his custody (Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973)).  
Habeas is a procedure particularly unsuited for a challenge to a death sentence based on 
statistical evidence of a pattern of racial disparity in sentencing decisions.  The level of 
proof is high requiring “exceptionally clear” proof of an abuse of the sentencing 
discretion, and may not be too ‘speculative’ (Bracy v. Gramley, (1997)).  Discovery 
rights are limited and individual state and federal post-conviction remedies must first be 
exhausted (Graines, 2000).  
It has been suggested that Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 (2004) 
[“Section 1983”], which affords a remedy for constitutional injuries arising under state 
statutes (‘color of state law’), might prove a better vehicle to present race-based 
discrimination claims as to death sentencing and that a class action might be more 
appropriate where statistical analyses are the only proof of such disparity (Graines, 2000).  
A Section 1983 action is a civil action – a kind of constitutional tort action -- brought in 
federal or state court, and is thus subject to the more relaxed procedural and evidentiary 
standards afforded in civil cases which particularly lend credence and weight to valid 
statistical evidence of the type found wanting in McCleskey (Graines, 2000).  It also 
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offers systemic relief in the form of injunction, declarations as to the constitutionality of 
the state action or law, recovery of attorney’s fees on success, and possibly money 
damages. 
Unlike habeas or an individual appeal, Section 1983 claims may be brought either 
individually or on behalf of a class of similarly harmed claimants – for example, all death 
row defendants sentenced under a sentencing statute asserted to be unconstitutional.  No 
one has tried a class action to raise racial discrimination in death sentencing and there are 
limits as to the kind of claim a convicted prisoner may assert in a Section 1983 action 
(Graines, 2000) and a question of when such a claim might ripen in the procedural path a 
death sentence follows post-conviction.  However, recently, in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 
U.S. 637 (2004), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of an individual death row 
inmate using Section 1983 to challenge the method of his impending execution.  In 
Nelson the prisoner sought Section 1983 relief from the use of the painful open-cut 
method used by Alabama for lethal injection, where the prisoner’s arm is slit open to 
reveal a vein, insuring proper insertion of the needle.   
Nelson sought injunctive relief against the use of that procedure in his execution, 
and preliminary injunctive relief from execution by lethal injection so long as that 
procedure was used by Alabama, claiming it was cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment.  A deciding factor in the Supreme Court’s approving the use of a Section 
1983 action in this case was the defendant’s prior unsuccessful completion of the habeas 
corpus process and other state remedies.  Section 1983 thus may not be available to an 
individual before he has sought habeas corpus relief and any state remedies, including 
administrative relief, and has failed, unless he can show that such remedies would have 
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no chance of success (Nelson, 2005).  This may apply to class actions as well – the 
members of the class may be limited to those death row inmates who have exhausted 
other remedies. 
Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a death sentence directly (Nelson, 
2005).  A key factor noted by the Nelson court for the allowing a Section 1983 claim in a 
death sentence context was the fact he was not attacking his conviction or sentence, only 
the method of execution.  Thus the claim could not assert that the defendant or class was 
innocent, or that the death penalty was not proportional to or even appropriate for the 
crime.   A claimant, or claimants, would have to concede guilt and the death-worthiness 
of their crime, and attack not their sentence but the statute and how it was applied, 
seeking not a reversal but alternative relief from application of the statute challenge in the 
form of life sentence – without parole -- instead of death, as a punishment 
It is unlikely that the current Court would totally abolish the death penalty, even 
should it find the Furman approach to be lacking.  An action raising questions of racial 
bias skewing application of the Furman standards and thus the imposition of the death 
sentence would more likely be successful seeking preliminary injunctive relief from 
executions until factual questions as to the existence and degree of racial disparity 
produced by application of a state’s death sentencing statute was settled.  Should the 
claimant demonstrate constitutionally unacceptable levels of racial disparity in who has 
received the death penalty and who has not, all that should be sought or granted is 
invalidation of the state statute in question, commutation of all death sentences it 
produced to life-without-parole, and at a minimum a moratorium on further death 
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sentencing in the state until a way is found to prevent constitutionally significant 
disparity – i.e., the Furman remedy.     
Alternatively, a preliminary injunction could seek a nationwide comprehensive 
exploration of the issue of racism to determine if latent bias can be sufficiently reduced or 
eliminated in capital sentencing under Furman, and request a moratorium on further 
sentencing or executions pending the outcome.  A litigant would have to be prepared not 
only to present strong evidence to support any preliminary relief, but also a plan to 
complete such a study in a defined and not overly long time frame.  The focus would not 
be the Furman standards themselves, but the question of whether any legal standard is 
sufficient, at this point in time, to remove significant but unconscious racial bias from the 
capital sentencing decision.   
The details pro and con for this remedy are beyond the scope of this discussion, 
but such an action could provide a forum for full study of the efficacy of the Furman, 
unhindered by the more stringent, narrow evidentiary and procedural constraints on 
individual appeals or remedies such as habeas corpus.  The research presented here 
provides a good starting point because the North Carolina statute is an excellent 
embodiment of the Furman principles, and there is a thorough and reliable database 
available for capital penalty proceedings post-Furman. 
Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes 
Under the North Carolina sentencing statute (Section 15A-2000, NC General 
Statutes (2003)) capital juries have only two options, a death sentence or a sentence of 
life in prison, currently one without the possibility of parole except by executive 
clemency.  North Carolina uses a bifurcated guilt-penalty procedure and is a weighing 
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state.  It is a three step process: the jury first determines whether based on the evidence 
sufficient aggravators, limited to the eleven enumerated in the statute, exist – 
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt – which are sufficiently substantial to justify 
a death sentence.  Once one or more aggravators have been found by the group, the jury 
next decides individually but based on the evidence if there are mitigating circumstances 
or circumstances applicable to the defendant.  If so, each juror then decides if they are 
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, and they 
vote (Section 15A-2000(e), NC General Statutes (2003)).  A single juror thus can hang a 
jury – and ensure a life sentence -- by finding a single mitigator justifies – at least to him 
or her – mercy for that defendant.     
There are eight mitigators specified in the statute, which also has a ninth, catch-all 
provision allowing jurors to consider any other circumstance arising from the evidence 
which the jury deems to have mitigating value (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes 
(2003)(f)).  The final decision the jury must reach, unanimously, is whether, based on the 
first two findings the defendant should be sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the 
State's prison for life (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes (2003)).  The statute also 
requires, per Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, automatic and immediate appeal of death sentences to 
the North Carolina Supreme Court, which reviews for errors and also for proportionality 
to other similar crimes and defendants (Section 15A-2000(d), NC General Statutes 
(2003)).  The North Carolina statute thus provides an excellent framework in which to 
employ empirical analysis of the degree to which Furman has produced fair – and 
racially equitable – death sentencing. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Empirical Research and Statement of the Problem 
 
 
The intuitive question of whether there is racial disparity in the application of the 
death penalty in America has been the subject of numerous scientific studies, of varying 
degrees of sophistication and validity.  The research can be best be understood organized 
in three time frames: Studies of cases from the years pre-Furman, studies of cases after 
Furman went into effect through 1990 when a comprehensive federal study of racial 
disparity in capital sentencing was released (GAO Report, 1990), and the research since 
1990.   
Pre-Furman Research 
Studies of capital sentencing in cases before Furman showed a significant bias 
against Black defendants, particularly in the South.  Guy Johnson’s 1941 study, The 
Negro and Crime, looked at the comparative frequency of death penalty sentences 
between Black and White defendants between 1940-1940, and found that 32% of Black 
murder defendants received the death penalty, compared to only 13% of White 
defendants.  He also found a race-of-victim effect, with the death penalty being imposed 
in 17.5% of White victim cases, but in only .4% of the Black victim cases (Johnson, 
1941).  Garfunkel (1949) found similarly disparate racial effects in his study of death 
sentencing patterns in ten North Carolina counties for the years 1930-1941.  In 1969, 
however, a study of first-degree murder trials pre-Furman in California produced no 
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evidence of either a race-of-defendant or race-of-victim effect (Stanford Study, 1969).  
Wolfgang and Reidel’s 1973 study of racial patterns in death sentencing between 1945 
and 1965 in several Southern states, including North Carolina, discerned patterns similar 
to those found earlier by Johnson and Garfunkel, which were also consistent among the 
other states examined (Wolfgang & Reidel, 1973).  As noted earlier, by 1972, the 
possibility of racial bias in sentencing practices resulting in unfair death sentences had 
already been considered by the Supreme Court in McGautha/Crampton, in which the 
process was upheld.  In Furman, however, the Court decided that death, as the 
punishment produced from the procedurally fair process was not substantively fair or 
acceptable under the Eighth Amendment, and the law of death sentencing changed. 
Post-Furman Studies to 1990 
The thrust of the next stage in the empirical research was to see if the Furman 
principles, as implemented in procedures established under Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek changed 
the racial distribution of death sentencing.  In 1981, five years after Furman-compliant 
processes began to be implemented, Gary Kleck reviewed the published literature on 
racial effects on capital sentencing, and reached the conclusion that there no general 
racial bias was shown against Black defendants, except in Southern states; but that the 
death penalty was imposed less when the victim was Black, than when the victim was 
White (Kleck, 1981).  Six years later, Nakell and Hardy published a study of the initial 
post-Furman years, 1977-1978, and application of the Furman-based sentencing models.  
Unlike earlier studies, they controlled for case seriousness and found a race-of-defendant 
effect at the prosecutorial charging decision, but not at the sentencing stage – where a 
race-of-victim effect was noted (Nakell & Hardy, 1987).  In 1989, Gross and Mauro 
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published a study of death sentencing patterns from 1976-1980, using FBI and law 
enforcement data from eight states.  Like Nakell and Hardy, they controlled broadly for 
case characteristics and found a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of a 
defendant receiving the death sentence when the victim was White, which remained 
consistent, although reduced when race-of-defendant was added to the analysis (Gross & 
Mauro, 1989). 
The debate as to the existence of racial effects on capital sentencing outcomes 
continued in the first two decades after Furman, to the point that in 1990, the United 
States Senate authorized the General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the issue.  
Rather than conducting a time-consuming and expensive new analysis, the GAO elected 
to perform an evaluative synthesis of the twenty-eight studies of post-Furman sentencing 
patterns, six of which were also post-McCleskey (GAO, 1990).   
Included were the studies of Gross and Mauro, Kleck, Nakell and Hardy, and 
Wolfgang and Riedel (GAO,1990), as well as studies of death sentencing patterns 
generally (Berk & Lowery, unpublished 1985; Bowers, 1983; Foley & Powell, 1982; Keil 
& Vito, 1989; Klein, Abrahamse & Rolph, unpublished, 1989; Radelet & Pierce, 1985; 
Radelet, 1981; Riedel, 1976) and studies state specific to Georgia (Baldus, Woodworth & 
Pulaski, 1990; Barnett, 1985); Texas (Ekland-Olson, 1988); Louisiana (Klemm, 1986); 
Smith, 1987); Florida (Arkin, 1980; Foley, 1987; Lewis, Mannie & Vetter, 1979; Radelet 
& Vandiver, 1983; Zeisel, 1981), California (Klein, 1989), , South Carolina (Paternoster 
& Kazyaka, 1988), Kentucky (Gennaro & Keil, 1988; Keil & Vito, 1990), New Jersey 
(Benin et al., 1988), Illinois (Murphy, 1984), and Mississippi (Berk & Lowery, 
unpublished 1985) (GAO, 1990).    
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 The GAO assessed and rated the studies for quality in terms of design, selection 
of variables and statistical methodology (GAO, 1990).  The evaluation was not limited to 
sentencing, where Furman applies, but encompassed the entire capital justice process, 
looking at the potential for racial bias at each discretionary decision point (GAO, 1990). 
The GAO found a consistent race-of-victim effect, although it acknowledged that some 
studies, such as the Kiel and Vito (1990) study found race-of-defendant effects, and that 
Paternoster and Kazyaka (1988) found regional race-of-defendant effects (GAO, 1990).  
As a result, the GAO concluded that while there was evidence to support a finding of a 
main race-of-victim effect, any race-of-defendant effect was “equivocal” and varied 
“across a number of dimensions” (GAO, 1990). 
 The South Carolina study by Paternoster and Kazyaka looked at South Carolina 
prosecutorial charging decisions beginning in1977, when South Carolina’s Furman-based 
statute went into effect (Paternoster and Kazyaka (1988)  The study was important in that 
it demonstrated an urban-rural effect at the prosecutorial level which had a racial 
component – all defendants were at more risk of being charged with a crime in rural areas 
than in urban areas, Black defendants were at most risk, and those Black defendants who 
killed White victims were at the highest risk of all (Paternoster & Kazyaka, 1988).   This 
intrusion of racial bias at the charging stage, it was argued, had little possibility of being 
corrected at the sentencing or appellate stages if the defendant was found guilty.   One of 
the shortcomings of the study for purposes of examining the effect of race on the 
sentencing decision, however, was that neither defendant characteristics beyond race and 
gender, nor case-seriousness factors were controlled for in the analysis.  Since Furman 
applies only at the sentencing stage, and requires consideration both of case seriousness 
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as defined by the aggravators and defendant’s individual situation for purposes of 
mitigation, this study is not as valuable for assessment of bias in the sentencing process 
alone. 
 Gross and Mauro’s examination of racial disparities in capital sentencing is more 
pertinent to the limited issue of whether Furman as implemented through 
Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek produces color-blind results.  They looked at homicide data from 
eight states, most in the South: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia, between 1976 and 1980.   Like Paternoster and 
Kazyaka, they were looking at urban-rural differences in treatment of Black and White 
crime.  Unlike the South Carolina study, however, Gross and Mauro attempted to control 
for crime seriousness as well, incorporating variables felony homicide, stranger murder, 
multiple victims, victim female gender, and the method of killing {shot versus 
bludgeoning, strangling, stabbing), which they use to scale the cases roughly by 
aggravation level.  They also controlled for urban-rural, defendant and victim race, and 
interactive effects of race (Gross & Mauro, 1989).  Their study showed that the rural-
urban effect was strongest in the Southern states, particularly Georgia and Florida; and a 
similar geographic bias occurred for race-of-victim effects.  As noted earlier, no main 
race-of-defendant effect was shown except where the race of the victim was White. 
 In 1988, Bienan et al. examined all homicide cases committed in New Jersey from 
August 1982 -- when New Jersey’s Furman-compliant sentencing statute went into effect 
-- through the end of 1986, to assess which factors affected the sentencing outcome. The 
study was not limited to the penalty stage – few penalty cases were used – and its main 
focus was on the probability that a case progressed from the charging decision to capital 
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trial (Bienen et al., 1988).  Unlike the two earlier studies, this New Jersey study included 
not only case characteristics related to aggravation and defendant and victim 
characteristics such as gender, age and race (Black, White, Hispanic) but also socio-
economic factors such as income class, employment and relative physical disability.  The 
study produced what was characterized as ‘substantial differences’ based on racial 
differences, across geographic jurisdictions, including a significant race-of-victim effect 
(Bienen et al., 1988).  Here again, however, the primary stage in the process examined 
was the pre-sentencing stage, which may indicate a possibly pervasive racial bias in the 
capital  justice system as a whole, but cannot be used to assess the race neutrality of the 
Furman sentencing process itself. 
Post-1990 Studies 
 The post-1990 studies also generally document a race-of-victim effect on capital 
sentencing and less so a race-of-defendant effect (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003).  In a 
1991 study, Klein and Rolph found race-of-victim disparity in California capital penalty 
trials, with an unadjusted result showing a 9 percentage point race-of-victim disparity.  
The authors acknowledge that the effect shown was limited to the penalty stage and did 
not take into account earlier discretionary decision point where race could have an effect, 
such as the prosecutorial charging decision (Klein & Rolph, 1991).  The subsequent 
CART analysis3, including multiple case characteristics, showed race-of-victim to be a 
significant predictor of sentencing outcomes (Klein & Rolph, 1991).   
 
3 Baldus and Woodworth have reservations about the use of the CART methodology (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003), 
and the advantage of a CART analysis over a logistic regression analysis was the subject of a recent study by Berk, Li 
and Hickman (2004) in which they re-analyzed the Maryland capital sentencing data used by Paternoster and Brame in 
their 2003 empirical study.  Berk and his colleagues argue that the CART methodology produces more valid results 
than the conventional logistic regression model most often used in assessing racial effects and capital sentencing (Berk, 
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 In 1991, Radelet and Pierce published an analysis of Florida homicides between 
1976 and 1987, including 415 death cases.  The unadjusted results showed a race-of-
victim disparity of nearly 13 percentage points, notwithstanding similar aggravating 
circumstances.  A logistic regression analysis which included pertinent case 
characteristics such as victim sex and the location of the crime still produced a significant 
race-of-victim effect, with White victim crimes being 3.42 times more likely to end in a 
death sentence (Radelet & Pierce, 1991). 
 In 1995, two studies were published, one from Connecticut (State v. Cobb, 1995) 
and one from Kentucky (Keil & Vito, 1995).  The Connecticut study was small, 
examining 66 cases of capital murder guilt trials in 1973-1994.  The study was submitted 
in a direct appeal of a death sentence as support for a defendant-comparative [as opposed 
to a case-comparative] proportionality review (State v. Cobb, 1995).  The unadjusted data 
indicated a higher capital murder conviction rate for Black defendants than for White and 
lower conviction rate where the victim was Black.  In a lengthy opinion, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court rejected the study as insufficient overall, and also rejected the concept of 
defendant-comparative proportionality review (State v. Cobb, 1995).   
The second study by Keil and Vito in Kentucky, examined death eligible cases in 1976-
91, and assessed the combined effect of racial influences at the prosecutorial charging 
decision and jury sentencing decision in a logistic regression analysis that controlled for 
case and crime characteristics.  They found that Kentucky capital justice system was the 
most punitive of Black defendants who killed White victims, whose odds of receiving the 
 
Li & Hickman, 2004).  Logistic regression, however, remains the methodology most often used in racial studies of 
capital sentencing, and is the method used here. 
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death penalty increased by 1.41 over other defendant-victim combinations, and who 
suffered a similar increase in the odds of being charged with a capital crime in the first 
place (Keil & Vito, 1995).   
 By 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court became about the validity of the 
methodology it employed for comparative proportionality review which had been 
developed by Professor Baldus and his colleagues in 1988.  They had been retained by 
the state of New Jersey to develop a state-of-the-art method of assessing proportionality 
in capital sentencing, and developed a complex, multivariate model using what came to 
be known as an index-of-outcomes approach.  This was adopted by New Jersey in 1991 
and applied initially in 1992 (Marshall v. Loftin, 1992).  The predictive value of the 
Baldus model came under scrutiny by the New Jersey Supreme Court beginning in 1996, 
when it initiated a review of the model, and lead in 1999 to the Proportionality Review 
Project (In re Proportionality Review Project, 1980), under the supervision of a Special 
Master, Judge David S. Baime.   
The purpose of the study was to assess the continued viability and utility of the 
system of proportionality review developed for the New Jersey by Professor Baldus, a 
system which had proven unwieldy and unreliable (Baime, 2003).  With the assistance of 
Professors Weisburd and Naus, Judge Baime examined the Baldus methodology for 
proportionality review and in his report to the Court in 2001 found the Baldus model to 
be unreliable because of the small sample of cases on which it was originally based – a 
defect which Professor Baldus had noted himself – and because of the unwieldy number 
of variables used in the logistic regression analysis (Baime, 2001; Weisburd & Naus, 
2001).   
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In the same report, the first of continuing annual reports monitoring 
proportionality review in New Jersey, Baime and his colleagues recommended a three 
strategy analysis:  bivariate analysis using a revised ‘salient factors’ selection, regression 
analysis, and case-sorting techniques, looking at three decision points in the capital 
sentencing process – penalty stage, life-death outcomes over all death eligible cases, and 
prosecutorial election to seek the death penalty.  When the results of the three analyses 
converge, it can be safely assumed that the results are valid (Baime, 2003). The 2001 
report utilizing these three methods showed no direct statistically significant race-of-
defendant or race-of-victim effect at any stage. The study did find a geographic effect, 
with counties with a higher rate of Black victims – the more urban counties -- advancing 
fewer cases to a penalty trial than less urban counties with more White victims (Baime, 
2001; Baime, 2003).   
 In 1998, Professor Baldus and his colleagues completed a comprehensive study of 
capital cases in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  “The most important influence on our 
[Baldus and colleagues’] methodology” in developing the Philadelphia study was the on-
going New Jersey project (Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner & Broffitt, 1998).  
The Philadelphia study acknowledges the two primary shortcomings of the original New 
Jersey work: 1) the small sample size on which it relied and 2) the unwieldy number of 
variables used to try to capture case characteristics (Baldus et al., 1998).  The sample size 
issue was resolved in the Philadelphia study by the collection of data on 672 cases, 384 of 
which went to the penalty stage, including cases where the jury hung and an automatic 
life sentence resulted.   
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The number of factors used in the core analysis of the Philadelphia data was 
limited to on the number of statutory aggravators and mitigators as found by the jury, or 
present in the case if not found by the jury (Baldus et al. 1998).  Other logistic regression 
models were run incorporating additional variables such as socio-economic status and 
other case seriousness factors, and examining other decision points, such as the charging 
decision.  At the aggravator-mitigator weighing stage they found a statistically significant 
race-of-defendant effect based on the total aggravators and mitigators accepted – an odds 
multiplier of 29.0, significant at the .01 level, for Black defendants receiving the death 
penalty.  This effect was reduced, but still significant, when hung jury cases were 
included in the core model (Baldus et al., 1998).  Although more complex and evaluating 
many more dimensions of the sentencing decision, this study of Philadelphia cases has 
provided the approach for the study presented here. 
In 2000, Brock and his colleagues published an ex post facto analysis of charging 
and sentencing decisions in homicides in specified jurisdictions within Texas in 1980-
1996.  Using ratios they compared arrest to sentence results overall to selected 
jurisdictions which had the highest numbers of both homicide arrests and death 
sentences, all urban counties.  The initial ratios analysis showed a rural-urban effect, with 
more homicides and fewer death sentences in all urban areas except Houston/Harris 
County.  They also conducted ratio analyses controlling for defendant and victim race 
legitimate case characteristics, using an additive scale of case seriousness from 0 to 4.  A 
White-victim effect was found to be strongly associated with defendant culpability as 
measured by the aggravation scale (Brock et al., 2001).   
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During the same time frame, the United States Department of Justice, in 2000 and 
2001, released reports presenting unadjusted race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects 
in charging rates by federal prosecutors.  These reports present essentially descriptive 
analyses, but Baldus and Woodworth re-analyzed the data using logistic regression 
techniques and confirmed a statistically significant race-of-victim effect (Baldus & 
Woodworth, 2003).   
 In 2001, Professors Unah and Boger released their preliminary findings of an 
analysis of racial disparities in capital sentencing in North Carolina (Unah & Boger, 
2001). Using Baldus-type multiple regression analyses and logistic regression methods, 
they examined all ‘potentially capital cases’ in North Carolina between 1993 and 1997 
with the stated purpose of taking a “systematic look for patterns of racial discrimination 
in capital sentencing in the South, employing data more recent than 1984” (Unah & 
Boger, 2001).  Because they were looking at all stages of the capital justice process, 
included in their sample were all ‘death potential’ cases, including homicides that 
resulted in a charge of murder, first degree murder or second degree murder, for the 
period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997.   
The sample included 402 first degree homicides which went to a penalty phase 
and resulted in a life or death sentence.  A multistage sample technique was used to 
create an additional group of cases of second degree murder resulting in life or term of 
year sentences, for a total of 502 cases in the core dataset (Unah & Boger, 2001).  The 
independent variables included were not only the North Carolina statutory aggravating 
and enumerated mitigating factors, but also factors reflecting other case, crime and 
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demographic factors, for a total of thirty-six variables.  The model did not include non-
statutory catch-all mitigating factors.   
They ran models using all cases in the sample, only cases that went to trial, all 
death eligible cases, cases where the prosecutor sought the death penalty, and cases 
where there was a penalty trial.  As the literature would predict, they found a statistically 
significant race-of-victim effect – those murdering White victims were 3.4 times more 
likely to receive the death penalty.  They also found notable – but not statistically 
significant --  differences in the death sentencing rate for Black defendants murdering 
White victims, versus White defendants – at 6.4% versus to 2.6% and overall that Black-
on-Black homicides resulted in the lowest death sentencing rate of any combination 
(Unah & Boger, 2001).   
Also in 2001, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission of Virginia 
released an analysis of the charging decisions in a sub-sample selected from a larger 
sample of death eligible cases to reflect various geographic regions in Virginia.  The 
unadjusted data reflected a race-of-victim effect at the charging stage, but no race-of-
defendant effect.  In a logistic regression model of charging decisions which controlled 
for case characteristics reflecting crime seriousness, no statistically significant main 
racial effect was observed, although an increased effect of two case characteristics – 
defendant-victim relationship and crime jurisdiction – was seen when the victim was 
White (Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, 2001).  
Five studies were published in 2002, from Arizona (Bortner & Hall, 2002), 
Illinois (Pierce & Radelet, 2002), Indiana (Ziemba-Davis & Myers, 2002), South 
Carolina (MCord, 2002), and Nebraska (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2000).   
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Baldus and his colleagues looked at the rates of death sentencing in 189 death eligible 
prosecutions in Nebraska, only 89 of which had progressed to the sentencing stage.  The 
logical regression analysis of these cases produced no racial effect, neither race-of-
defendant nor race-of-victim (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2000). The original 
Arizona study did not analyze for race effects (Bortner & Hall, 2002).  Baldus and 
Woodworth performed a separate analysis of the data, taking into account crime death 
worthiness to the extent allowed by the data, and found a race-of-victim effect (Baldus & 
Woodworth, 2003).  Unadjusted race-of-victim effects were also found in the Indiana 
study of 224 murder convictions.  Only a rates analysis was performed, although a 
multivariate regression analysis is proposed for the future (Ziemba-Davis & Myers, 
2002).   
Pierce and Radelet looked at over 4000 murder convictions in Illinois between 
1988 and 1997, during which time only 76 death sentences were imposed.  They looked 
at unadjusted data, and performed a logistic regression analysis controlling for 28 
variables in addition to race.  No statistically significant race-of-defendant effect was 
seen, there was a significant race-of-victim effect and a geographic effect seen in the 
models (Pierce & Radelet, 2002).  A limited analysis of South Carolina sentencing rates 
in eleven homicide cases in 1998, selected by McCord for their extreme ‘depravity’ 
(McCord, 2002) also produced no race-of-defendant effect, but demonstrated a 
substantial race-of-victim effect.   
 The most recent studies, in 2003 and 2004 continue the pattern.  In 2003, 
Raymond Paternoster and Robert Brame published an analysis of 1,311 Maryland death 
cases death noticed and tried between July1, 978 and December 31, 1999, including 180 
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cases which progressed to penalty trial (Paternoster & Brame, 2003). The unadjusted 
results showed race-of-victim disparities which reached significance, but no significant 
racial differences in sentencing, nor significant geographic disparities in sentencing.  The 
logistic regression results controlling for relevant case characteristics, however, showed 
no significant race effects at the sentencing stage (Paternoster & Brame, 2003), although 
a race-of-victim and geographic effect were significant at the charging and death-noticing 
stages.  As previously noted, in 2004, Berk, Li and Hartman re-analyzed the Maryland 
data used by Paternoster & Brame using a CART analysis instead of logistic regression, 
and maintain that it produces more reliable results – in this case, no racial effects at all 
(Berk, Li, & Hartman, 2004). 
Finally, Baldus and Woodworth have cited a third, smaller but ‘instructive’ 
analysis of race in capital sentencing by Professor James McAdams, a supporter of the 
death penalty (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003).  McAdams concludes that, despite increased 
sophistication in the analyses performed to assess racial disparity in capital sentencing, 
the results remain the same: 1) race-of-defendant is not, in and of itself, a statistically 
significant ‘main effect’ in death sentencing; 2) race-of-victim is a significant factor in 
death sentencing, with all defendants being more likely to receive the death penalty if 
their victim is White; 3) Black defendants who kill White victims have the highest rate of 
death sentence; and 4) Blacks who kill Black victims have the lowest rate of death 
sentence (McAdams, 1998).  
Research Problem 
All of the studies noted above focused on whether there are main racial effects 
showing racial disparity in capital sentencing outcomes, and most looked at sentence 
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outcome as the product of racial bias in the entire capital justice process.   None 
examined the sentencing decision solely as a product of application of the Furman/Gregg 
standards.  This may be because of an unwillingness to abandon the argument lost in 
McCleskey and a continued desire to prove a denial of equal protection and an inference 
of purposeful discrimination in the form of the disparate impact of the entire capital 
justice system on Black citizens (Baldus, 2004; Howe, 2004)   There may be no 
statistically significant disparity in the number or distribution of death sentences between 
the races sufficient to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.  Even so, significant race-based disparity 
in how the Furman sentencing standards – the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
– are applied may be indicative of unconscious racial bias which offends other 
constitutional principles.   
This nonpurposeful form of bias may be incapable of cure through legal process 
yet still skew the sentencing process against Black citizens in a way repugnant to other 
constitutional principles requiring jury impartiality, predictability in death sentencing and 
protection from irrational sentence disparity.  Identical aggravators may be applied more 
harshly to one race or the other, or vary disproportionately based on the race of the 
victim.  Similarly, the mitigators may work better in reducing the chances of a death 
sentence based on a defendant’s or the victim’s race – they might be more mitigatory for 
White defendants than Black, despite comparability of the crime. 
Earlier studies were not designed to look at latent, nonpurposeful racial 
discrimination in the application of the Furman standards, but that is not to say that the 
methodology cannot be used for such research.    The studies fall generally into three 
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approaches:  1) the use of unadjusted and case characteristic-adjusted data in rates 
analyses and logistic regression models per Baldus, Paternoster and others; 2) the use of 
CART methodology to analyze case data proposed by Berk et al. (2004) and used earlier 
by Klein and Rolph (1991), and 3) the three stage combination of methods used by 
Baime, Weisburd and Naus in New Jersey.   
The Baldus-type model is generally considered the most reliable and cost-
effective, although the number of variables, the size of the case sample and the decision 
point modeled will greatly affect the outcome (Unah & Boger, 2001; Baldus & 
Woodworth, 2003).  It is also the most flexible in turns of ease of use, and the ability to 
use available information and produce meaningful results.  For that reason, it has been 
selected as the best methodology to assess racial invariance in the application of the 
North Carolina Furman-based standards, as proposed here. 
Logistic regression analysis of racial disparities in the facially neutral application 
of Furman-based standards is a logical way to test for latent racism in jury decision-
making under the Furman/Gregg design (Baldus & Woodworth, 2004).  The Philadelphia 
study suggests that the total number of aggravating circumstances – as measure of crime 
seriousness and defendant culpability -- and to a lesser degree, mitigating circumstances 
which a capital jury accepts may be the best predictors of capital sentence outcome 
(Baldus & Woodworth, 2004; Baldus et al. 1998).  If there are statistically significant 
differences in the effect of jury acceptance and application of the same number of 
aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances on sentencing outcomes among similarly 
situated Black and White defendants, it arguably reflects unconscious racial attitudes of 
jurors.   
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To assess whether the Furman capital sentencing model is working in a race-
neutral way, it is appropriate to look only at the sentencing stage; that is where the 
Furman/Gregg factors operate.  The question of race infecting other stages of the capital 
justice process is important overall to the question of racial neutrality in the 
administration of capital justice, but irrelevant to the question of whether capital juries 
are color-blind.  Indeed, studies have shown the largest racial bias effect appears at the 
prosecutorial charging phase, and that it can be a function of politics and geography, as 
well as race (Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Alison & Mills, 1988).  
As discussed earlier, other studies have demonstrated extra-Furman influences, 
such as geography and socioeconomic differences, which may be important in explaining 
racial variance in capital sentencing results, but may be irrelevant to whether the Furman 
standards are producing constitutionally acceptable results.  The same can be said for 
studies examining the jury panel itself, its racial composition and the lack of 
understanding of its role in the sentencing process (Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, 1998; 
Bowers, Steiner, & Sandys, 2001; Bowers & Foglia, 2003).  While informative as to the 
dynamics of the jury decision-making process, these do not address the core question of 
whether the Furman model is working in a racially fair and equal way. 
These studies are relevant to the question of juror unconscious predispositions to 
impose the death penalty, overall and based on race – their own, the defendants’ or the 
victims’ -- but are too limited to allow conclusions as to racial invariance in application 
of the Furman standards universally or under a specific state’s standard.  A meaningful 
test of the Furman model would encompass a long time frame post-Furman, all or most 
of the capital cases which reached the penalty stag during that time, under a specific 
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statutory scheme compliant with the Furman standards implemented through 
Gregg/Jurek/Proffitt statutory schemes.  That is the study presented here, of most, if not 
all, of the capital penalty decisions made by juries under North Carolina’s capital 
sentencing statute over a period extending of more than ten years. 
Hypotheses 
The starting point should be the bare application of Furman to the facts and the 
defendant, by the jury, at the sentencing stage using a Furman-compliant state capital 
statute, in this instance that of North Carolina.  The goal is to determine whether the 
North Carolina statute works to channel capital jury discretion in imposing the death 
sentence in racially invariant and thus constitutionally acceptable ways, as Furman and 
Gregg intended.  The hypotheses to be tested are: 
 1.  Each unit increase in the level of aggravation a capital jury finds increases a 
defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence. 
2.  Each unit increase in the level of mitigation a capital jury accepts decreases a 
defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence. 
3.  Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances increases the likelihood of a 
death sentence more for Black defendants than similarly situated White defendants. 
4.  Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances decreases the likelihood of a 
death sentence more for White defendants than similarly situated Black defendants. 
5.  Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances has a stronger effect on 
defendants whose victims are White than those whose victims are Black, but whose 
crimes are comparable, in increasing the odds of receiving a death sentence. 
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6.  Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances has a stronger effect on 
defendants whose victims are Black than those whose victims are White, but whose 
crimes are comparable, in decreasing the odds of receiving a death sentence. 
7. Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances has the strongest effect on 
increasing the odds of receiving a death sentence where the defendant is Black and his 
victim is White. 
8.  Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances has the strongest effect on 
decreasing the odds of receiving a death sentence where the defendant is White and his 
victim is Black. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology 
 
Data 
 
The analysis is based on information originally compiled from reviews of capital 
murder trials, including penalty phase proceedings, in North Carolina between 1978 and 
2002.  LexisNexis searches of North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases 
allowed identification of cases in which the defendants were convicted of or pled guilty 
to first-degree murder, the state sought the death penalty, the trial progressed to a 
sentencing phase whereby the jury heard evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating 
factors, and the jury issued a binding recommendation for a sentence.  
There are 1073 cases in the original dataset from trials held during the period 
1978-2003.  North Carolina sentencing procedures with regard to jury consideration of 
mitigating factors changed in 1990, as a result of the holding in McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 449 U.S. 433 (1990).  Prior to McKoy the North Carolina sentencing statute 
disallowed jury consideration of mitigating factors unless the jury had accepted them as a 
whole.  McKoy clarified the role of mitigators, holding that any individual juror could 
rely on any relevant mitigating circumstance when making the sentencing decision.  To 
eliminate the possible effect of this change in how mitigators are used by North Carolina 
juries, cases using pre-McKoy procedures as to mitigation and decided before May 1, 
1990 were deleted.  The May date was selected arbitrarily, being about 90 days from the 
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issuance of the McKoy holding, as sufficient time for the McKoy principles to have been 
adequately implemented by North Carolina’s trial courts.   
The original data reflected the race-of-defendant and victim in three categories:  
White, Black and ‘other’.  In order to focus on the defined Black-White race distinction, 
those cases where either defendant or victim race was coded as ‘other’ were deleted, 
leaving a total of 632 cases involving Black or White victims and Black or White 
defendants for use in the analysis.  These cases include 374 Black defendants and 258 
White defendants, and 244 Black victim and 388 White victim cases.  The breakdown of 
defendant-victim racial composition is White defendant/White victim = 232 cases; White 
defendant/Black victim = 26 cases; Black defendant/Black victim = 218 cases, and Black 
defendant/White victim = 156.  Most of the cases (71%, n=450) are intra-racial, fairly 
evenly distributed between Black-on-Black cases [218] and White-on-White cases [232].  
Of the remaining 182 cases which are inter-racial, the small number of White-on-Black 
cases [26] confounds any analysis of that set of cases or comparison of inter-racial 
homicides.       
Because the focus of the analysis is jury application of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the sentencing decision, the dataset includes all cases where the 
sentencing phase was conducted, including ‘hung jury’ cases where the jury declared that 
they could not reach the required unanimous decision regarding a sentence, resulting in 
the default sentence of life in prison; and retrials, where two separate juries considered 
the facts independently and recommended a sentence in the same case.  The inclusion of 
hung jury cases has been found to decrease the effects of aggravators because a hung jury 
always results in a life sentence (Baldus et al., 1998); however, because that sub-sample 
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of cases represents application of the North Carolina sentencing statute, those cases have 
been kept in the sample used for the analysis.  As to retrial cases, inclusion of these cases 
increases sample size of instances where separate juries applied accepted aggravators and 
mitigators to reach the life-death decision, albeit to the same case, they are thus relevant 
for purposes of examining racial invariance in this process.  
The units of analysis are individual capital cases from the North Carolina Capital 
Sentencing Project (NCCSP) database, limited to those cases which reached the penalty 
phase and in which aggravators and mitigators were considered by the jury in penalty 
trials in North Carolina between 1990 and 2003. The data was collected by M. D. Smith 
(USF), Beth Bjerregaard (UNC-Charlotte) and Sondra J. Fogel (USF), for the North 
Carolina Capital Sentencing Project.  Because each homicide victim constitutes a 
separate capital offense requiring separate jury findings and sentencing, each victim case 
was coded separately, although the defendant was the same.  
The data collection instrument [DCI] used was a Baldus-type instrument designed 
to capture defendant, victim, jury and case characteristics, incorporating over 125 items.   
The sources of the data were official state records, primarily those of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court and the North Carolina Courts of Appeal as maintained by the North 
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), trial courts in the counties, and 
other state criminal justice related agencies.  To the extent possible, missing information 
was supplemented by media reports and individual interviews.  
Materials collected from state appellate records include defendant and state briefs, 
as well as the jury Issues and Recommendation Form which records jury acceptance or 
non-acceptance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and concludes with the jury’s 
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sentencing recommendation. Historically, these materials have been published in hard-
copy form and placed in two university law libraries in North Carolina, while other 
locations have microfilm copies. Beginning with decisions returned from cases tried in 
1999, hard copies have not been made available, but materials are accessible via an 
electronic data file (http://www.ncappellatecourts.org ).   This information was 
supplemented with newspaper accounts of the trial where such coverage was available 
through LexisNexis or Newsbank another electronic databank that includes varying years 
of stories from eight North Carolina newspapers.   
Defendant and crime information was obtained online from the North Carolina 
Department of Corrections at (http://www.doc.state.nc.us/offenders).  Through 1996, 
victims’ age, race, and sex were taken from a commercially available CD-ROM, North 
Carolina Vita Records: Deaths 1968-1996. For 1997-2002, victim personal information 
was determined from some combination of court material (such as reference to the victim 
in the state’s or defendant’s appeals briefs), newspaper accounts, or obituaries obtained 
through World Wide Web search engines. Cases for which this information could not be 
obtained are not included in the dataset.   
The lack of a centralized source of information regarding capital murder trials in 
North Carolina makes it difficult to determine the exact number of capital murder trials 
conducted during the period covered in the data.  Since appeals of death sentences are 
automatically referred to the state Supreme Court, all of those cases are included. A large 
proportion of defendants receiving a life sentence appeal their first-degree murder 
convictions to the Courts of Appeal, so most of the life sentence cases included in the 
database were identified in the lower appellate court records, as well as in those cases 
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subsequently appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, although that court has the 
option of declining to hear the case.  
There are two instances where defendants are unlikely to appeal, and therefore 
their cases may not be included in the dataset. First, if a defendant pled guilty and 
received a life sentence, there was little basis for appeal. Second, some defendants’ 
convictions were upheld but their death sentences vacated. If, upon retrial of the penalty 
phase only, the sentence was life, there was no basis for appeal and no means to identify 
these cases other than a county-by-county search.  However, in the former situation no 
penalty phase jury decision was involved, so such cases are irrelevant to the analysis.  As 
to the latter situation, while these retrial cases are relevant to the analysis of the jury 
decision-making process, the number is likely to be small, based on the relatively small 
number [76] of guilt-and-penalty phase retrials, which are included in the database.   
A much smaller set of trials not included in the dataset are those that were 
identified, but whose case materials are not available because hard copies were missing 
from both libraries or not yet posted in electronic form.  Given that the substantial 
majority of capital cases are appealed to at least one of these courts, we estimate that the 
available data contain reviews of more than 90% of all sentencing recommendations 
made by North Carolina capital juries during the ten plus year period.  This provides an 
excellent sample to test racial effects on the sentencing decision under the Furman 
model. 
Some data is missing from some cases.  If the jury recommendation form is 
missing, the specific aggravators and mitigators used cannot be determined.  Some cases 
were ‘default life’ cases where either no aggravator was found or the aggravator was 
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insufficient to recommend death.  However, for the variables used in the instant study – 
total and individual aggravators and mitigators accepted – only 7 cases were incomplete 
from the 632 cases available.  Comparisons of these missing data cases with those 
remaining in the dataset revealed an overrepresentation of life sentence cases, suggesting 
that the reduced dataset overstates the proportion of death sentence cases; however, 
comparisons of major demographic and legal variables between life sentence cases 
included and not included in the working dataset revealed no major sources of bias in the 
cases used for the analysis.      
Variables 
 
For purposes of the analysis, the dependent variable is the defendant’s sentence, a 
dichotomous variable coded 0 = life, 1 = death sentence.  There are 302 life sentence 
cases and 330 death sentence cases for the total 632 cases.  There are four (4) classes of 
independent variables:  the two target variables of defendant and victim race and the two 
Furman factors -- the statutory aggravating circumstances (“aggravators”) and statutory 
and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances (“mitigators”) considered by capital juries at 
the sentencing phase.  These factors are analyzed both as ranges of total factors accepted 
and as individual factors (Baldus et al. 1998, Baldus & Woodworth, 2004).  
The total number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances submitted to, 
rejected and/or accepted by each jury was coded for each case.  Because the number of 
mitigators which can be considered in a given case is limited only by relevance, as 
opposed to the statutorily limited number of aggravators which can be considered, the 
difference between the number of aggravators and mitigators considered can be very 
large.  In order to achieve an approximation of relative low, medium and high levels of 
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jury-determined aggravation and mitigation, ranges of total aggravators and mitigators 
accepted were used for comparison purposes (Baldus et al. 1998).   
Variable Recoding 
 Table 1 sets out the variables and their coding and the case frequencies.  All 
independent variables have been dichotomized, with 1 representing the target category.   
The original race-of-defendant and race-of-victim variables, after deleting the cases 
where the race designation was ‘other’, were recoded from the original three categories of 
‘White’=1, ‘Black’=2 and ‘other’=3, to White=0 and Black=1, in order to compare the 
effect of a defendant or victim being Black on the likelihood of receiving the death 
penalty under similar circumstances, to not being Black.    
As noted above, numeric counts for the total number of aggravators and 
mitigators accepted in each case were re-organized into ranges of total factors accepted 
which could be compared.  The ranges were chosen for rough approximation of levels of 
aggravation and mitigation, from lowest represented by 1 and 2, mid-range by 3, and 4 
and 5 representing the higher levels of case seriousness/defendant mitigation the jury 
accepted (Baldus et. al, 1998).  This also was intended to achieve some standardization in 
comparative counts because of the very broad range of mitigators [0 to 50] considered 
compared to the much smaller range of aggravators accepted [0-50].  Counts of 
aggravating circumstances were recoded from actual counts to 0 aggravators accepted = 
1, 1 - 2 aggravators accepted = 2, 3 - 4 aggravators accepted = 3, 5 – 9 aggravators 
accepted = 4.  Counts of mitigators accepted, including both statutory and non-statutory, 
were coded 0 mitigators accepted = 1, 1-2 mitigators accepted = 2, 3 – 5 mitigators 
accepted = 3, 6 – 10 mitigators accepted = 4, 11 – 50 mitigators accepted = 5.  The ranges 
 Table 1:  Variable Frequencies and Coding. 
 All White Black 
   D 
White 
    V 
Black WD/ WD/ 
WV 
BD/ BD/ 
BV WV BV Cases     D     V 
N 632 258 374 388 244 26 232 156 218 
Sentence          
(0)Life 302 118 184 180 122 19 99 81 103 
(1)Death 330 140 190 208 122 7 133 75 115 
Total Aggravators Accepted         
(1)=0  29 13 16 18 11 0 13 5 11 
(2)=1-2  380 168 212 220 160 24 144 76 136 
(3)=3-4 176 74 102 120 56 1 73 47 55 
(4)=5-9 28 2 26 16 12 0 2 14 12 
Total Mitigators Accepted         
(1)=0  23 11 12 17 6 0 11 6 6 
(2)=1-2  42 19 24 32 11 0 19 13 11 
(3)=3-5 95 37 58 55 40 1 36 19 39 
(4)=6-10 174 68 106 99 75 10 58 41 65 
(5)=11-50 289 123 166 180 109 15 108 72 94 
Aggravators (0=not submitted/ submitted not accepted/missing, 1=accepted) 
Felony murder 241 99 142 168 79 5 94 68 74 
Murder 
Pecuniary Gain 
135 52 83 100 35 0 52 48 35 
HAC  203 97 106 135 68 5 92 43 63 
Viol. Conduct 273 105 168 158 115 11 94 64 104 
>1 Person Risk 29 11 18 15 14 0 11 4 14 
Prior Viol. Fel’y 179 61 118 104 75 3 58 46 72 
Murder In Jail 5 3 2 2 3 1 2 0 2 
Prior Capitol Off. 18 6 12 10 8 1 5 5 7 
Escaping 75 33 42 50 25 3 30 20 22 
Kill Law Enf.Officer 5 2 3 4  0 2 2 1 
Kill Gov’t Officer 21 4 17 3 18 0 4 14 3 
Mitigators (0=not submit/submit not accept/individual accept not required/ not accept/missing,      
1=accepted) 
Insig.Prior Recd 217 104 113 138 79 15 89 49 64 
Men/Em.Distress 299 144 155 180 119 15 129 51 104 
D Age 78 26 52 45 33 4 22 23 29 
D Capacity 207 102 105 118 89 18 84 34 89 
D Minor Accomplice 25 7 18 16 9 0 7 9 9 
D Under Duress 48 26 22 30 18 6 20 10 12 
D Aid Prosecution 51 20 31 37 14 3 17 20 11 
Vic. Consent 8 2 6 1 7 1 1 0 6 
D Drink 120 80 40 77 43 13 67 10 30 
D Drugs 137 64 73 86 51 10 54 32 41 
D Physic. Abuse 103 53 50 64 39 6 47 17 33 
D Sexual Abuse 36 17 19 19 17 0 17 2 17 
D Broken Home 73 35 38 39 34 7 28 11 27 
D Dad Gone 118 32 86 62 56 4 28 34 52 
D Mom Gone 51 23 29 35 17 0 23 12  17 
Foster Home 20 13 7 17 3 0 13 4  3 
Parent Misconduct 127 66 61 80 47 5 61 19 42 
D IQ 67 25 42 35 32 2 23 12 30 
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DSpecificMent.Cond. 101 52 48 67 35 7 45 21 28 
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were chosen for rough approximation of levels of aggravation and mitigation, from 
lowest represented by 1 and 2, mid-range by 3, and 4 and 5 representing the higher levels 
of case seriousness/defendant mitigation the jury accepted (Baldus et al., 1998). 
As for each individual aggravating and mitigating circumstance accepted, the 
coding instrument provided four (4) categories for aggravating circumstances:  1=not 
submitted; 1=submitted but not accepted; 3=accepted and 9=missing/not found.  These 
were collapsed into two categories: 0 = not accepted [including not submitted, submitted 
but not accepted, and missing cases] as the default category and 1 = accepted, as the 
effect being tested.  
The NC statutory aggravators are felony murder, murder for pecuniary gain, 
heinous/atrocious/cruel murder, murder during violent conduct, murder resulting from 
conduct threatening more than one person, prior violent felony, murder while 
incarcerated, prior capital offense [adult and certain juvenile], murder of a law 
enforcement officer, and murder of a court or governmental official in course of their 
duties (Section. 15A-2000(e), NC General Statutes2004).   
In the specifically enumerated mitigators in the North Carolina sentencing statute 
are defendant has no significant prior record, defendant acted under emotional or mental 
distress, defendant’s age, defendant lacked capacity to understand his act, defendant was 
a minor accomplice, defendant acted under duress, defendant aided the prosecution, and 
the victim consented to the conduct resulting in his death (Section. 15A-2000(e), NC 
General Statutes, 2004).   
The non-statutory mitigators allowed under the ‘catch-all’ provision at Section 
15A-2000(3)(9) and recorded by the DCI are defendant’s alcohol abuse, defendant’s drug 
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abuse, defendant was physically abused as a child, the defendant was sexually abused as 
a child, defendant came from a broken home, defendant’s father was absent from the 
home, defendant’s mother was absent from the home, defendant was in foster care, 
defendant witnessed parental misconduct as a child, defendant’s low IQ, and defendant 
suffers from a specific mental disease. 
There were six (6) categories of possible responses in the coding instrument 
applicable to both the statutory and non-statutory mitigators:  1=not submitted; 
2=submitted but not accepted; 3=accepted; 4=acceptance of individual circumstances not 
required of jury; 5=aggravators not accepted; and 8=aggravating circumstances ruled by 
jury as not sufficient to justify death penalty.  Since the analysis examines only the effect 
of jury accepted aggravating and mitigating circumstances on life-death outcomes, these 
variables were collapsed like the aggravators, and recoded to reflect acceptance as the 
targeted effect -- 0=not accepted, encompassing all responses except ‘accepted’, and 
1=accepted.    
Statistical Analysis 
Logistic regression analysis was employed, using SPSS to assess 1) the effect, if 
any, of jury acceptance of aggravators or mitigators -- both as to total factors accepted 
and individual factor effects -- on sentencing outcomes, and 2) whether there is racial 
invariance of these effects.  The core analysis controlled for the effect aggravators and 
mitigators on sentencing outcomes by ranges of totals accepted, and defendant and victim 
race and is reported at Tables 1 and 2.  The second set of models takes into account the 
possibility that some factors might have a greater effect on jury decision-making than 
other factors also accepted in a case, and looks at the individual effect of each aggravator 
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and mitigator on sentencing outcomes in an effort to sort out possible dilution of effect 
from the initial grouping of factors in the first model set 
The logistic regression analysis for both the total- and individual factor accepted 
included eight models:  all cases, Black defendant cases, White defendant cases, Black 
victim cases, White victim cases, and defendant-victim race combinations 
[WhiteD/WhiteV; BlackD/BlackV; BlackD/White V].  If a variable in one model showed 
a statistically significant effect, the z-test for the statistical significance of differences in 
effects across other models was used to determine if the difference between the two 
models, and the subset of cases they represented, was actually significant (Paternoster, 
Brame, Mazerole & Piquero, 1998).  There were two few cases of White defendant-Black 
victim cases [26] to analyze.   
Logistic regression was employed because the dependent variable, life death 
sentencing outcomes, is dichotomous and linear regression was not appropriate (Baldus et 
al. 1998).  Unlike linear regression, logistic regression does not produce coefficients 
which predict actual values; logistic regression estimates the effect an independent 
variable has on the likelihood – the odds – a particular outcome will occur, in this case, a 
death sentence.  The regression coefficient (B) indicates the direction and strength of a 
variable’s effect on the likelihood of receiving a death penalty; the odds ratio, as 
expressed by the exp (B), indicates the size of the change in the odds of a death sentence 
a given variable has.  Overall model fit was measured by the Wald Chi-square statistic, 
with variance in sentencing outcomes explained by the model indicated in the Pseudo-R2 
statistic. The unstandardized b coefficient statistical significance for each test variable is 
reflected in the individual Wald statistic.  Statistical significance of an effect is measured 
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at alpha level .05 [p < .05], meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the variable 
has no effect on the odds of the outcome occurring in the population given the observed 
effect for the sample analyzed.  For purposes of the final analysis and discussion, only 
results at alpha levels less than .05 are discussed.   
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Chapter Five 
 
  Results 
 
Models of Ranges of Total Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances Accepted 
Table 2 sets out the results of the first five of the eight models run using the 
ranges of total aggravators accepted and total mitigators accepted, selected to 
approximate low, medium and high aggravation and mitigation levels for comparison 
purposes.  These models examined all cases, only Black defendant cases, only White 
defendant cases, only Black victim and only White victim cases.  Table 2 represents the 
results of the defendant-victim race combination models.  In each of the models, legally 
relevant factors – the aggravating and mitigating circumstances – are statistically 
significant at p < .05, and the effect is in the expected direction.   
All-cases model. 
The all-cases model shows each that each one unit increase in the range of 
aggravating circumstances accepted increases the odds of any defendant receiving a death 
sentence by a multiple of 5.4.  Each increase in the range of mitigators accepted 
decreases the odds of a death sentence by a multiple of .64, or 64%.  Across all cases, 
however, neither defendant nor victim race were significant predictors of a capital 
sentence.  There was an unexpected negative direction in these effects, indicating a slight 
decrease in the likelihood of receiving a death sentence based on race of defendant or 
victim, but as noted, neither was statistically significant.  The predominance of intra-
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racial cases [71% of all cases] may, in part, account for this result.     The adjusted R2 
statistic of .407 for the all-cases model indicates substantial variation left unaccounted for 
by this model.  Some of the remaining variation is likely due to the inability to measure 
differences in the weights a juror might afford different aggravators or mitigators, the 
“weighing” of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the balancing of their 
respective net weights.  It is also possible that legally irrelevant factors omitted from the 
model may contribute to the unexplained variation. 
Nevertheless, looking only at the all-cases model, the North Carolina capital 
sentencing process appears at first glance to be operating as intended -- death sentences 
appear to be largely based on legally relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
and not on irrelevant or extra-legal factors such as defendant or victim race.  However, 
the subsequent models demonstrate that the effects of the level of jury-accepted of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not racially invariant, and that the 
dissimilar effects of the level of aggravators accepted produce statistically significant 
differences in the odds of receiving a death sentence based on defendant and/or victim 
race. 
Defendant race-specific models. 
The results of the defendant race-specific models, set out in Table 2, demonstrate 
an increased effect from jury acceptance of aggravators on sentencing for Black 
defendants – the aggravators are substantially more aggravating for Black defendants, 
with the odds of receiving a death sentence 2.7 times more than similarly situated White 
defendants.  The odds of a Black defendant receiving the death penalty increase by a 
multiple of 7.7 with each unit increase in the level of aggravation, compared to an
Table 2.  
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  All-cases and Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Results Showing Effect of Total 
Jury-Accepted Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 - 
December, 2002). 
Variables All Cases 
White 
Defendants z-scores 
Black                        White        
Defendants                Victims 
z-
scores Black Victims 
Exp 
(b)  B
Exp 
(b) B S.E. Exp(b)
 B Exp  B S.E. Exp(b) B S.E. S.E. S.E. (b)
Defendant Race -.348 .232 .706 NA NA NA  NA NA NA .562 .267 .570* z=.31 .386 .506 1.472 
  (DRACENEW)                  
Victim Race -.145 .232 .865 .731 .503 2.078  -.443 .276 .642 NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
  (VRACENEW)                  
Total Aggravators  1.679 .198 5.362* 1.057 .304 2.878* z=2.4* 2.04 .272 7.693* 
1.56
2 .242 4.768* z=.73 1.877 .348 6.535* 
   (ATOTNEW)                  
Total Mitigators -1.018 .115 .361* -1.166 .189 .392* z=.95 -.937 .152 .392* 
-
1.05
4 
.145 .348* z=.52 -.929 .193 
65 .395* 
  (MTOTNEW)                  
Constant .811   2.069    -.569   
1.17
3    -.650   
                  
R2 = .407   .391    .445   .421    .397   
 
*p <. 05                  
 
 
increase of only 2.9 for White defendants.  This is a statistically significant difference [z 
= 2.4, p=.0164], demonstrating considerable variance in the effect of jury-accepted 
aggravating circumstances on sentencing outcome, across defendant’s race.  Some of this 
variance may be attributed to the weights afforded individual aggravators and the 
collective weighing process by the jury, but there is no data as to these factors.  Even so, 
it appears that although for each unit shift in aggravation level the odds of a death 
sentence increase for all defendants, Black defendant may pay a higher premium for the 
level of aggravation found.   
As to the effect of mitigating circumstances, the slightly less mitigatory effect of 
each unit increase in the range of mitigators accepted for a Black defendant [61%], over 
the odds reduction from mitigation for a White defendant [69%] is essentially racially 
invariant; there is no statistically significant difference [z =.95, p=.177].  In these race-
specific models, Black defendants benefit from nearly the same discount enjoyed by 
White defendants for each increase in the level of mitigation accepted.   Moreover, since 
the number of mitigators which may be considered is limitless, the mitigatory effect of 
jury acceptance of mitigators is diluted with each additional mitigator accepted.  Jury 
acceptance of aggravators has a statistically significant different effect from acceptance 
of mitigators [z=2.8, p=.0026].  This may be due to a dilution effect based on the 
relatively small number of aggravating circumstances [11] available to North Carolina 
juries versus the unlimited number of mitigating circumstances which can be considered, 
but may also reflect the greater weight an aggravator – which must be found unanimously 
and beyond a reasonable doubt -- carries for a jury.  In any case, it appears that jury 
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acceptance of aggravating circumstances drives the capital decision-making process, and 
Black defendants are treated more harshly once aggravating circumstances are accepted.  
As in the all-cases model, the effect of victim race fails to attain statistical significance 
regardless of defendant race. 
Modeling total aggravating and mitigating circumstances is also more predictive 
for Black defendants than for White defendants.  The R2 values increased in the Black 
defendant case model to .445, compared to the .407 in the all-cases model.  The White 
defendant model was slightly less efficient than the all-cases model, with an R2 of .391.  
This difference in predictive value -- nearly 45% for  Black defendants compared to 39% 
for White defendants -- is another indication that jury acceptance of aggravating 
circumstances has an enhanced aggravating effect on sentencing outcomes for Black 
defendants over  White.   
 There is also a difference in the intercept values between the defendant race-
specific models which should be noted.  The constant in the White defendant model is 
positive; it is negative in the Black defendant model.  This indicates that omitted variable 
bias and other sources of systematic error in these models enhance the odds of a capital 
sentence for White defendants, but decrease them for Black defendants.  Here again it is 
likely that the absence of the weights applied to each factor and the balancing of accepted 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances account for a considerable portion of this 
modeling error.  However, this may also be evidence of less arbitrariness operating in 
Black defendant cases than in White defendant cases -- a lack of arbitrariness which may 
work to the detriment of Black defendants in terms of consistently harsher treatment. 
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Victim race-specific models. 
The last two sets of models reported in Table 2 sets out the effects of different 
ranges of aggravators and mitigators accepted on capital sentencing outcomes in victim 
race-specific cases.  Here again the effects of jury acceptance of additional aggravators 
and mitigators are statistically significant and in the expected directions for both Black 
and White victim cases, but the differences in the effects across models are not 
statistically significant and thus not demonstrative of race-of-victim variation.  It should 
also be noted that the aggravator effect is stronger for Black victim cases [multiplier of 
6.5] than for White victim cases [multiplier of 4.7], an unexpected result, but the 
difference is not statistically significant [z = .73 (p=.4645)].  This difference may also 
reflect the skewed distribution of intra- versus inter-racial cases in the sample, in which 
there are more Black-on-Black cases [n=218] than Black-on-White cases [n=156]. 
As to the effects of mitigator acceptance by race of victim, the odds of a 
defendant whose victim was White are reduced by 65% for each unit increase in the 
range  of mitigators the jury accepts, compared to a reduction of 60% for those whose 
victims were Black, indicating an unexpected stronger mitigatory effect where the victim 
was White.  This may be because the majority of White victim cases had White 
defendants [232/388], and thus this may reflect the overall advantage apparently enjoyed 
by White defendants.  In any case, the differences in mitigatory effects between White 
and Black victim cases is not statistically significant [z = .52 (p=.6031)].    The race-of-
defendant effect is also significant for White victim cases, but not for Black victim cases, 
but in an unexpected negative direction.  The effect is small, decreasing the odds of a 
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defendant whose victim is White receiving the death penalty by .43, and the difference in 
the effect of race-of-defendant is not significant between Black and White victim cases 
[z=.73 (p=.4654)].  As noted earlier, the negative constant for Black victim cases 
indicates that omitted variables and systematic errors decrease the odds of a death 
sentence when the victim is Black, and slightly increase the odds when the victim is 
White.  Although the Black victim model is a slightly better fit,   the White and Black 
victim models perform comparably in predicting sentencing outcomes, with comparative 
R2 values of .421 and .397, respectively and neither is as predictive as the Black 
defendant only case model.   
All defendant-victim racial combination models.  
The lack of a racially different effect from jury acceptance of aggravating factors 
on capital sentencing outcomes is more clearly seen in the defendant-victim racial 
combination models set out in Table 3.  Analyses for White defendant-Black victim cases 
could not be undertaken because there were too few cases [n=26], so it is not possible to 
compare inter-racial cases.  However, the results of the other three racial combinations 
show substantial racial variance in aggravation effects.   
As to intra-racial cases, the odds of a Black defendant who kills a Black victim 
receiving a death sentence is increased 6.4 times for each unit increase in the range of 
aggravators, compared to an increase by 2.8 times for a White defendant who kills a 
White defendant.  This difference is statistically significant [z=1.8, p=.0359].   Although 
the multiplier is higher for Black defendants whose victim was White, than for Black-on-
White cases, the difference was not statistically [z=.8 p=.4237).  There is, however, racial 
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difference in effect between Black and White defendants when the victim is White.  The 
death sentence odds for the Black defendants with White victims increase by 9.8 for each 
increase in the level of aggravation, compared to only a 2.8 multiplier for the White 
defendant whose victim is White and killed under similarly aggravated circumstances.  
This difference – Black defendants being nearly five (5) times more likely to receive a 
death sentence than White defendants who commit comparable murders of White 
victims, is statistically significant [z=2.4 (p =.0164)].   
Consistent with the other models, the defendant-victim racial combination models 
show significant effects of the ranges of mitigators accepted, regardless of defendant and 
victim race.  The odds of receiving the death sentence are reduced 69% in White 
defendant-White victim cases, 60% in Black defendant-Black victim cases, and 63% in 
Black defendant-White victim cases for each one unit increase in the range of mitigators 
accepted.  Although there is a slightly higher benefit for White defendants whose victims 
are White, and the least effect is for Black defendants whose victims are White, the 
differences are not statistically significant between any defendant-victim racial 
combinations.   
Here again the intercept for Black defendants, regardless of victim race, is 
negative, indicating that omitted variables and systematic error account for a slight 
reduction in the odds of receiving a death sentence; which may indicate less arbitrariness 
operating in Black defendant cases than in White defendant cases, a lack of arbitrariness 
which works to the detriment of Black defendants in terms of consistently harsher 
treatment.  Even so, the results indicate that Black defendants pay a premium for their 
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race with each increase in the level of aggravation accepted by a capital jury, regardless 
of the race of their victim; the highest price may be paid when the victim is White.   
The R2 values show a better fit for the models for Black defendants whose victims 
are White.  The model explains 52% of the variance for Black defendant- White victim 
cases, versus only 39% in White defendant-White victim cases, and 40% in Black 
defendant-Black victim cases as well as the all-cases model.  The fits for the intra-racial 
models are slightly lower than for the all-cases model, but comparable.   
Finally, it should be noted that the aggravator effect is consistently the stronger 
effect across all models controlling for comparable levels of aggravation and mitigation.  
Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances appears to have the stronger effect on 
sentencing outcome for Black defendants, regardless of the race of their victim, but is 
strongest in Black defendant-White victim cases.  This supports the conclusion that Black 
defendants are treated more harshly by juries overall, in terms of the risk of a death 
sentence, than White defendants whose crimes are comparable.  This also supports the 
conclusion that despite application of the Furman principles significant racial invariance 
has not yet been achieved in capital sentencing, and sentencing bias based on a 
defendant’s race is still a significant factor in capital sentencing.  
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Table 3.   
 
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  Race-of-Defendant and Race-of-Victim 
Combinations Showing Effect of Total Jury-Accepted Aggravating and Mitigating 
Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 -December, 
2002). 
 
Defendant Race Victim Race Variables B S.E. Exp(B) 
White Defendant Black Victim4 NA NA NA NA 
        
  White Victim Total Aggravators Accepted 1.023 .306 2.782* 
    Total Mitigators Accepted -1.182 .196 .307* 
    Constant 2.946   
                                        R2 =.385    
Black Defendant Black Victim Total Aggravators Accepted 1.851 .349 6.367* 
    Total Mitigators Accepted -.931 .199 .394* 
    Constant -.197   
                                        R2 =396    
  White Victim Total Aggravators Accepted 2.291 .431 9.883* 
    Total Mitigators Accepted -.963 .238 .382* 
    Constant -1.523   
                                       R2 =.517    
      
  z-scores    
Defendant-Victim Combinations Total Aggravators Accepted                                  Total Mitigators  Accepted 
z= 2.4*                                                                           z= .72                  WhiteD-WhiteV –  BlackD-White V 
z=1.8*                                                                            z=  .9 WhiteD-WhiteV --  BlackD-Black V 
BlackD-WhiteV –  BlackD-Black V  z=.8                                                                                z=  .1 
    
  
 
*p < .05     
                                                 
4 The small number of White-on-Black cases [n=26] prevented analysis of these cases. 
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Results of Modeling Accepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. 
All-cases models. 
The results of the individual factor models are consistent with the totals accepted 
models, and are set out in Tables 4 and 5.  Table 4 sets out the all-cases and the defendant 
and victim race-specific models.  Table 5 reports the racial combination models.  In the 
all-cases models, there was a significant race-of-defendant effect and a non-significant 
effect for race-of-victim, both in an unexpected negative direction.   The Black defendant 
race-specific model and both victim race-specific models echo these negative directions 
for the racial variables.  Race-of-victim was negative and significant in the Black 
defendant model, but positive and not significant in the race-specific White defendant 
model.  The difference in effect was not statistically significant.  In the victim race-
specific models, the defendant race effect was negative in both the Black and White 
victim models, but neither was significant, nor was there any statistically significant 
difference between them.  
These unexpected directions are possibly a reflection of the Black defendant and 
intra-racial crime sample bias.  There is a higher percentage of Black defendants in the 
sample overall, 59% [374/632] of the cases have Black defendants, compared to 41% of 
the cases with White defendants [258/632].  As previously noted, the distribution based 
on defendant and victim race is somewhat skewed.  The preponderance overall are intra-
racial cases [71% (450/632)], of which the majority -- 58% (218/450) -- are Black-on-
Black.  As to the remaining 29% [182/632] of the cases which are inter-racial, 86% 
[156/182 are Black-on-White -- only 26 cases involve White defendants and Black 
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victims. Thus analysis and comparison is only viable as to how juries treated Black 
defendants overall, and in comparison to White defendants who kill White victims.  Thus 
the race-of-victim effects cannot be fully evaluated, except as to White victims, but the 
sample is sufficient to assess race-of-defendant effects. 
Returning to the all-cases model, shown in Table 4, five (5) aggravators showed 
strong, significant effects:  felony murder [n=241], heinous/atrocious/cruel (HAC) 
murder [n=203], murder during violent conduct [n=273], prior violent felony record 
[n=179], and prior capital record [n=18].  HAC showed the strongest effect, with a 
multiplier for the odds of receiving a death sentence of 5.7, over all cases where accepted.  
These five aggravators had significant effects where accepted, in most models, and HAC 
was significant in all models.  The small number of cases in which a prior capital record 
was accepted make the results as to this aggravator less reliable, although it is worth 
noting that two-thirds [12/18] of the cases where this was a factor had Black defendants. 
As to the mitigators, over all cases five (5) statutory mitigators and three (3) 
nonstatutory mitigators had a significant effect, all in the expected negative direction:  no 
significant prior record [n=217], age [n=78], capacity [n=207], minor participation in the 
crime [n=25], and duress [n=48].  The nonstatutory mitigators which showed a 
significant effect were alcohol abuse [n=120], father absent from childhood home 
[n=118], and defendant had a specific mental illness [n=101].  All were in the expected 
negative direction. Sample size was an issue as to the mitigation effect overall of 
defendant as minor accomplice, duress and age, and this issue becomes more pronounces 
as the models are parsed into racial-specifics and combinations. As would be expected 
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with the addition of variables, the model fit increased for the all-cases model from .407 
using only ranges of aggravation and mitigation accepted, to .516 for the individual factor 
model of all cases.  That is, defendant and victim race, and jury acceptance of individual 
aggravating and mitigating factors explains almost 52% of the variance in the life-death 
decision. 
Defendant race-specific models. 
Consistent with the all-cases model, there is a negative race-of-victim effect in the 
Black defendant model, which is significant and indicates a 58% decrease in the 
likelihood of a death sentence based on victim race – but the difference with the White 
defendant effect is not statistically significant [z=.31, p=.03783].   As to the aggravators, 
the same five aggravators significant in the all-cases models are also significant in either 
the Black or White defendant model, and a sixth aggravator – murder for pecuniary gain 
[For $$] shows a significant positive effect on the life-death outcome in both Black and 
White defendant models.  There are race-based differences, some of which are significant 
and some of which are not.   
Felony murder and a prior capital felony record are not significant for White 
defendants but are for Black defendants -- but the differences in effect are not statistically 
significant.  The effects of a prior violent felony record and murder for pecuniary gain are 
also significant for Black defendants but not for White, but here the differences are 
statistically significant.  A Black defendant is almost 9 times more likely to receive the 
death sentence if he has a prior violent felony record than a White defendant with such a 
record.  Where the murder is found by the jury to have been for pecuniary gain, the Black 
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defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence increase by a multiplier of 3.3, compared 
to only a multiplier of 1.2 for a White defendant. 
Two of the aggravators, HAC and murder during violent conduct, have a 
significant enhancing effect on the likelihood of a death sentence for both Black and 
White defendants.  There is no significant difference in the effect of violent conduct, and 
the odds ratios are comparable – a 3.91 increase for White defendants and a 3.95 increase 
as to Black defendants.  HAC shows a much greater and statistically significant different 
[z=2.0, p =.0228] effect on Black defendants – the multiplier for White defendants where 
HAC has been accepted in aggravation is 4.2, versus 15.8 for Black defendants.  As 
discussed more particularly below, this difference increases dramatically in the racial 
combination models, showing the greatest effect where the defendant is Black and the 
victim is White, and the multiplier increases to 83.2. 
The significant mitigatory effects were in the expected negative direction and 
similarly mixed to some degree by race of defendant.  Only defendant’s age and capacity 
were significant for both Black and White defendants with age being slightly more 
mitigatory for Black defendants [n=52] than White [n=26], and lack of capacity for 
White defendants [n=102] than for Black [n=105], but the differences were not 
significant [age z=.2, p=.4207]; capacity z=.5, p=.3805]. A defendant’s minor role in the 
crime [n=25] significantly reduced a Black defendant’s odds of a death sentence by 94% 
and showed no significant effect for White defendants, but the difference was not 
statistically significant [z=.004, p=.4984], and the result undoubtedly affected by the 
small sub-sample size.   
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One interesting result was the effect of the lack of a significant prior record 
[n=217].  This factor was significant for White defendant cases [104] but not for Black 
defendant cases [113], reducing the odds of receiving a death sentence by 88%, compared 
to only 37% if the defendant was Black, and the difference in effect was statistically 
significant [z=2.6, p=.0047].  On the other hand, the effect of a jury’s acceptance of a 
defendant’s duress [n=48] was significantly [z=1.96, p=.025] greater for Black defendant 
cases [22] than for White [25], reducing the odds of a death sentence by 92% for Black 
and only 65% for White defendants.  
As in the level of aggravation and mitigation models, the effect of jury acceptance 
of the HAC aggravator is strongest for Black defendants, and the difference in effect 
between Black defendants [15.8 multiplier] and White defendants [4.2 multiplier] is 
significant [z = 2.0, p=.0228].  HAC has the strongest effect of all for Black defendants 
whose victims are White, with a multiplier of 83.2.  The difference between the HAC 
aggravation effect on White defendant-White victim cases and Black defendant-White 
defendant cases shown on Table 5 was also statistically significant [z=2.1, p =.0179], as 
was the difference in the HAC effect between White and Black intra-racial crime 
[z=1.97, p =.0244].  One interesting result was the lack of statistical significance in the 
difference of the HAC effect between Black-Black and Black-White cases; it seems that 
Black defendants are going to be penalized more than White defendants in terms of effect 
on sentencing from acceptance of the HAC aggravator regardless of the race of their 
victim, but the greatest effect will be if the victim is White.  Again, it must be noted that 
more [58%] of the Black defendant cases had Black victims. 
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Felony murder was significant in the all-cases model but not statistically 
significant for White defendants in the defendant-race specific model or the White-on-
White case model.  As tables reflect, the effect of this aggravator is comparable across all 
models, and there was no statistically significant difference among them.  This may be in 
part because felony murder is not usually a stand-alone aggravator unless the defendant is 
the triggerman, since the holdings in Enmund v. Florida (1982) and Tison v. Arizona 
(1987), and because of the double-dipping issue which prevents counting both the felony 
itself and felony murder as two separate aggravators.  Felony murder had a significant 
aggravating effect on Black defendant cases overall, but only in the Black intra-racial 
model.    It was significant for Black defendants, but the difference in effect on Black and 
White defendant cases was not significant.  Felony murder was also not significant. 
except where the victim was White.  Murder for pecuniary gain [For $$] was   Four 
others – felony murder, murder during violent conduct, prior violent felony record and 
prior capital offense – were also statistically significant in the all-cases model.  As to the 
defendant race-specific models, as would be expected, more individual aggravators were 
significant for Black defendants than for White. For Black defendants felony murder,  
murder for pecuniary gain, murder during violent conduct, prior violent felony record, 
and prior capital offense were all significant, in addition to HAC.  For White defendants, 
only HAC, and murder during violent conduct had a statistically significant effect. 
Victim race-specific models. 
As to the victim race-specific cases, four of the aggravating factors were 
significant for both Black and White victim cases:  felony murder, HAC, murder during 
 78
violent conduct, and prior violent felony, but the differences were not statistically 
significant.  Prior capital offense was also significant if the victim was Black, in the small 
sample of Black victim cases where this aggravator was accepted (n=8).  Jury acceptance 
of the HAC aggravator proved to have a strong increased effect on the odds of a Black 
defendant receiving the death penalty. 
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Table 4.   
 
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  All-Cases, Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Models Showing Effect of Jury - 
Accepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 
– December, 2002). 
 
 
                                            All Cases                         White Defendants            z **           Black Defendants                      Black Victims                 z           White Victims 
 B  S.E. Exp(b) B S.E. Exp(b)      B S.E. Exp(b)    B S.E. Exp(b)    B S.E Exp(b)
Defendant Race -.683 .307 .505* NA NA NA  NA NA NA -.373 .811 .689  -.627 .367 .534 
Victim Race -.410 .296 .664 .126 .693 1.134 .94 -.872 .394 .418* NA NA NA  NA NA NA 
Felony murder 1.143 .268 3.136* .795 .477 2.214 1.2 1.520 .395 4.574* 1.305 .492 3.688* .6 
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.960 .365 2.611* 
For  $$  .470 .300 1.599 .160 .530 1.174 1.46 1.194 .463 3.299* 1.065 .668 2.900  .541 .390 1.178 
HAC  1.748 .271 5.744* 1.428 .447 4.172* 2.0* 2.760 .473 15.796* 2.659 .570 14.282* 1.1 1.934 .369 6.919* 
Viol. Conduct 1.045 .257 2.844* 1.364 .515 3.913* .02 1.375 .386 3.954* 2.021 .538 7.548* 1.7 .892 .360 2.441* 
>1 Person Risk .507 .547 1.661 -.332 1.044 .717  1.196 .808 3.307 1.092 .919 2/980  1.005 .786 2.731 
Prior Vio. Fely .967 .297 2.630* -.171 .532 .843 2.9* 2.203 .453 9.055* 1.514 .570 .4.543*  1.007 .413 2.737 
In jail -.009 1.449 .992 -.196 1.837 .822  17.359 25592. 34E+07 16.982 26723 2372278  -.813 1.696 .443 
Prior Cap. Off. 1.654 .756 5.226* 1.655 1.639 5.232 .44 2.484 1.058 11.994* 3.901 1.477 49.464*  1.268 1.225 3.555 
Escaping .598 .385 1.818 .830 .665 2.294  1.210 .717 3.355 1.507 .897 4.515  .200 .474 1.222 
Kill Officer -.125 1.307 .882 19.914 27292 45E+08  -.821 1.699 .440 20.437 40192 7.5E+08  -1.084 1.624 .338 
Kill Gov. Off. .337 .720 1.401 -.612 1.480 .542  .909 .861 2.482 -.089 1.529 .915  .834 .910 2.032 
No SigRec. -1.163 .269 .313* -2.129 .493 .119* 2.6* -.464 .398 .629 -.788 .486 .455 1.56 -1.760 .386 .172* 
Mt/Em Dis. .221 .260 1.247 .144 .463 1.155  .323 .380 1.381 .449 .439 1.567  .010 .366 1.011 
D Age -1.383 .384 .251* -1.563 .801 .209 .2 -1.751 .550 .174* -1.166 .711 .312 .9 -1.959 .540 .141* 
D Capacity -1.322 .260 .267* -1.614 .441 .199* .5 -1.336 .399 .263* -1.471 .488 .230* .02 -1.483 .357 .227* 
D Minor Acpl. -2.598 .768 .074* -20.30 14013 .000 -- -2.694 .957 .068* -.755 1.094 .470  -22.796 7983 .000 
D  Duress -1.805 .506 .164* -1.051 .705 .349 2.0 -3.926 1.232 .020* -4.289 1.511 .014*  -1.250 .618 .287 
D Aid Prosec. -.094 .457 .910 -1.365 .811 .255 .6 2.335 .818 10.328* .939 1.250 2.559  .273 565 1.314 
Vic. Consent -.745 1.186 .475 .617 2.226 1.853  -19.15 16329. .000 -19.03 14153 .000  21.183 40193 1.6E+09 
                  
*p <.05                  
 
**   1 The z-score indicates whether the difference in effect between two models is statistically significant ((Paternoster, Brame, Mazerole & Piquero, 1998). 
 
Table 4, continued.   
 
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  All-Case, Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Models Showing Effect of Jury-
Accepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May,1990 -
December, 2002). 
 All Cases White Defendants z Black Defendants Black Victims z White Victims 
 B S.E. Exp(b) B S.E. Exp(b)      B S.E. Exp(b)    B S.E. Exp(b)     B S.E. Exp(b)
D Alcohol -.805 .341 .447* -.654 .603 .520  -.693 .614 .500 -.062 .645 .940 -.873 .485 .418 
D Drugs .115 .319 1.122 -.302 .603 .739  .302 .494 1.352 .060 .630 1.062 .132 .457 1.141 
D Physical Abuse -.168 .353 .845 -.389 .531 .677  -.461 .630 .631 -.187 .684 .830 -.471 .478 .625 
D Sexual Abuse .124 .543 1.131 -.523 .802 .592  1.345 1.014 3.840 1.350 1.180 3.858 -.482 .716 .618 
D Broken Home -.139 .359 .871 -.283 .580 .754  .493 .563 1.638 -.279 .569 .756 -.235 .535 .790 
D Father Absent -.756 .334 .470* -1.94 .795 .144* 1.8* -.395 .424 .674 -.327 .513 .721 -1.217 .525 .296 
D Mother Absent -.144 .467 .866 -1.88 1.074 .153  1.283 .720 3.606 1.465 .934 4.329 -.834 .674 .434 
D in Foster Home .611 .711 1.843 2.682 1.250 14.612* 1.1 .731 1.265 2.078 1.584 1.522 4.873 .872 .860 2.391 
D Saw Parent’l Misc. .067 .306 1.069 .695 .507 2.003  -.694 .510 .500 -.397 .535 .672 .558 .447 1.745 
D Low IQ .231 .395 1.260 .397 .697 1.488  -.385 .595 .681 .279 .708 1.322 .96 
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.595 .571 1.813 
D Spec. Mtl Ill -.70 .311 .495* -.917 .533 .400  -.598 .489 .550 -.624 .607 .536 -.551 .427` .576 
   Constant .478   1.301    -1.71   -1.52   .600  
   R2 .516   .626    .888   .607   .568 
 
     
*p < .05     
The strongest effect is seen on Black defendants who commit crimes found by the jury to 
be heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC).  The odds multiplier for HAC in the all-cases 
model was 5.7, but in the Black defendant model rose to 15.8, compared to a decrease as 
to White defendants from the all-cases model to 4.2.  The difference in effect of the HAC 
aggravator on the likelihood of receiving a death sentence, between White and Black 
defendants was statistically significant [z=2.1 (p<.05)].  An unexpected result was the 
disparity in the effect of the HAC aggravator based on victim race.  Jury acceptance of 
the HAC aggravator increased the odds of a death sentence more when the victim was 
Black – by a multiplier of 14.3 -- than when the victim was White, which increased the 
odds by a multiplier of 6.9, but the difference between them was not statistically 
significant [z=1.1, p=.2713)]   
As to mitigating circumstances, only one factor was significant in all eight models 
using the individual aggravating and mitigating circumstances – defendant’s capacity to 
understand the criminality of his act.  The seven mitigators significant at p<.05 over all 
cases were defendant’s non-significant prior record, age, defendant was a minor 
accomplice, under duress, abused alcohol, defendant’s father was absent from the 
childhood home, and defendant suffered a specific mental illness.  All of these effects 
were in the right direction, indicating a mitigatory effect – albeit slight -- on sentencing 
when accepted.  When looking mitigation effects in the defendant race-specific models, 
in addition to defendant’s capacity, both sets of defendants showed other mitigatory 
effects significant at p<.05, although these additional mitigators differed in some respects 
by race.   
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The White defendant model showed significant mitigatory effects as to no 
significant prior record, defendant’s age, lack of capacity, duress, defendant aided the 
prosecution.  The Black defendant model showed age, lack of capacity, minor 
accomplice, duress, and aid to the prosecution as significant.  All of the effects were in 
the right direction, indicating a mitigatory effect, except as to aiding the prosecution, 
which was significant for Black defendants but in the wrong direction, indicating an 
increase by a multiplier of 10, in the odds of a death sentence for Black defendants who 
helped the prosecution.  The difference between Black and White defendants was not 
statistically significant [z=1.1 (p=.2713)].  There was a similar unexpected positive 
direction for the foster home mitigator as to White defendants, producing a statistically 
significant multiplier of 14.1, but the difference was similarly not significant [z=1.1 
(p=.2713)].  In fact, there were no significant differences in the mitigatory effects of any 
of the mitigating factors, between Black and White defendants.   
The defendant victim race-specific models showed a reduced number of 
mitigatory factors where the victim was Black, with only defendant’s capacity and duress 
showing a significant effect.  The White victim model produced significant effects from 
where the defendant had no significant prior record, and based on his age, lack of 
capacity, duress, and the father being absent from the home.  All effects were in the 
expected direction and none of the differences in mitigatory effects based on victim race 
were statistically significant. 
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Defendant-Victim racial combination models. 
The defendant-victim racial combination models are reported in Table 5 produced 
mitigatory effects consistent with the all-cases models.  Defendant age and lack of 
capacity were significant for all racial combination, but the differences across models 
were not significant.  The same mitigatory factors were significant for Black defendants 
in the racial combination models as had been in the defendant race-specific model, except 
defendant as minor accomplice was not significant in any racial combination model, and 
duress was only significant in the Black defendant-Black victim cases.  The foster home 
and witnessing parental misconduct mitigators showed as significant in White-on-White 
crime but not in the Black intra- or inter-racial crimes.  There was a statistically 
significant difference in the mitigatory effect of defendant’s duress on intra-racial cases, 
where the mitigatory effect was stronger for Black-on-Black crime, than for White-on-
White crime [z=2.4 (p=.0214).  Except for the duress mitigator for Black defendants, 
there were no significant differences in mitigatory effect of other factors and there was no 
significant differences in the effect of any of the mitigators as between interracial cases 
where the defendant was Black, or any cases where the victim was White. 
As to model fit, the R2 values increased for all of the individual factor models 
over the total factors accepted models.  The all-cases value went from .407 to .516, 
explaining 52% of the variance.  The White defendant case model R2 value increased 
from .391 to .588, indicating that 59% of the variance is explained by the individual 
aggravating and mitigating factors.  The Black defendant model value increased from an 
R2 value of .445 to .626, explaining nearly 63% of the variance between sentencing 
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outcomes.  The victim race-specific models also increased from an R2 value of .421 to 
.568, increasing in fit by 15 percentage points.  The model fit for Black victim cases also 
improved, the 40% [R2=.397] explained by the all-cases model growing to nearly 61% 
[R2=.607] of the variance explained in the individual factor Black victim case model. 
The use of individual factors improved the fit of the racial combination models.  
The White-on-White model using individual factors explained about 60% [R2=.598] of 
the sentencing outcome variance, over only 39% of the variation explained by levels of 
aggravation and mitigation.  The Black-on-Black model improved from 40% using the 
ranges of factors accepted, to 62% with individual factors accepted.  Overall, the models 
appear to be more efficient in predicting sentencing outcomes for Black defendants, and 
when individual factor are measured.  The largest increase in fit between the aggravation-
mitigation level models and individual factor models is for Black-on-White crime, going 
from explaining 52% to 80% of the variation in sentencing outcome.  
The North Carolina statute overall seems to be working efficiently to produce 
consistent sentencing results, particularly for Black defendants who endure a consistent 
and predictable disadvantage as to how the aggravating factors affect their sentencing 
outcome.  Most of the unexplained variance is in cases where the defendant is White.  
While some of the unexplained variance is attributable to unknown factors such missing 
variables and systemic error, and to the inability to factor in the individual weights of the 
factors or the weighing of the aggravators and mitigators, it appears that race is playing a 
role in how the Furman-compliant standards are applied, and raising the question of 
arbitrariness and possible jury bias.
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Table 5.   
 
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  Defendant-Victim Racial Combination Models Showing Effect of Jury-Accepted 
Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 –
December, 2002). 
  White Defendant – White Victim1  Black Defendant – Black Victim  Black Defendant – White Victim 
 B  S.E. Exp(b)  B S.E. Exp(b)     B
 
S.E Exp(b)
Felony murder .823 .512 2.277  1.385 .528 3.996*  1.380 .858  3.974 
For  $$  .014 .546 1.014  .871 .681 2.389   2.627 1.067 13.832* 
HAC  1.506 .484 4.510*  3.042 .625 20.952*  4.421 1.246 83.214* 
Viol. Conduct 1.287 .543 3.620*  1.999 .571 7.385*  
 
.860 .817 2.363 
>1 Person Risk -.114 1.103 .892  1.450 .983 4.265   3.206 2.004 24.684 
Prior Vio. Fely .024 .583 1.025  1.857 .639 6.403*   4.247 1.154 69.908* 
In jail -.281 2.046 .755  17.080 25916.037 26175712.907   NA NA NA 
Prior Cap. Off. .288 1.850 1.333  3.465 1.521 31.971*   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.992 6950.775 481179454.364 
Escaping .292 .675 1.339  1.146 1.014 3.145  1.121 1.679 3.067 
Kill Officer 19.775 27229.935 387506038.119  20.187 40192.970 584927857.974  -42.428 24716.259 .000 
Kill Gov. Off. -.573 1.498 .564  -.001 1.628 .999  3.061 1.719 21.340 
No SigRec. -2.205 .553 .110*  -.604 .538 .547  -1.302 .933 .272 
Mt/Em Dis. .160 .527 1.174  .348 .477 1.416  -.848 .941 .428 
D Age -2.349 .898 .095*  -1.654 .780 .191*  -2.797 1.141 .061* 
D Capacity -1.615 .490 .199*  -1.420 .535 .242*  -2.389 .954 .092* 
D Minor Acpl. -21.001 13525.905 .000  -1.146 1.142 .318  -49.299 12440.513 .000 
D  Duress -.633 .726 .531  -4.656 1.527 .010*  -17.048 9955.123 .000 
D Aid Prosec. -.507 .906 .602  2.944 1.840 18.997  3.723 1.538 41.39* 
Vic. Consent 19.809 40192.970 400870714.217  -18.858 16422.489 .000  NA NA NA 
            
p  .05            
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Table 5, continued .:   
 
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios):  Defendant-Victim Racial Combination Models Showing Effect of Jury-Accepted 
Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 –
December, 2002). 
  
 
 White Defendant – White Victim1    Black Defendant – Black Victim  Black Defendant – White Victim B  S.E. Exp(b)  B S.E. Exp(b)    
  B S.E Exp(b)
D Alcohol -1.135 .669 .321  -.527 .722 .591  1.932 2.357 6.903 
D Drugs -.107 .655 .898  .163 .731 1.176    -.396 1.051 .673 
D Physical Abuse -.684 .591 .504  -.569 .831 .566    .822 1.503 2.275 
D Sexual Abuse -.599 .810 .549  1.469 1.328 4.346    18.889 7295.652 159781410.692 
D Broken Home -.188 .670 .828  .316 .649 1.372 
87  .777 1.854 2.176 
D Father Absent -2.334 .916 .097*  -.295 .551 .745    -1.203 1.091 .300 
D Mother Absent -1.595 1.164 .203  1.634 1.001 5.125    -.194 1.544 .823 
D in Foster Home 2.541 1.298 12.689  1.387 1.528 4.004    3.054 10.908 21.193 
D Saw Parent’l Misc. 1.161 .601 3.192  -.497 .607 .608    -.982 1.667 .375 
D Low IQ .054 .792 1.056  .239 .795 1.270    .214 1.367 1.239 
D Specific Mental Illness -1.069 .588 .343  -.950 .686 .387  1.044 1.016 2.841 
   Constant 1.562    -2.026      -2.933   
   R2 .598    .624   
 
 .795   
*p < .05        
 
     1There were two few cases (26) for SPSS to produce results for the White Defendant-Black Victim cases.  z- scores 
Z-Scores 
White Def/White Victim – Black Def/White Victim     White Def/White Victim – Black Def/Black  Victim Black Def/White Victim – Black Def/Black Vic. 
             Felony Murder  z= .76   Felony Murder  z= .025  
   Murder for Pecuniary Gain: z= 2.18*             Murder for Pecuniary Gain z= .82   
   HAC   z= 2.1*       HAC   z= 1.97*   HAC   z= 1 
   During Violent Conduct z= .44       During Violent Conduct z= .9   During Violent Conduct z= 1.14 
   Prior Violent Felony z= 3.27*       Prior Violent Felony z= 2.1*   Prior Violent Felony z= 1.8* 
           Prior Capital Felony z= 1.32   Prior Capital Felony z= .0000+  
   No Sig. Prior Record z= .83       No Sig. Prior Record z= 2.07*   No Sig. Prior Record z= .68 
   Defendant Age  z= .3       Defendant Age  z= .6   Defendant Age  z= .8 
   Defendant Capacity z= .8       Defendant Capacity z= .4   Defendant Capacity z= .9 
            D Under Duress  z= 2.4*  
  Defendant Aid Prosecutn     z= 1.8*             Defendant Aid Prosectn z= .32 
 D Father Absent  z= .8       D Father Absent  z= 1.905*  D Father Absent  z= .7
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
Study Purpose and Results 
The purpose of this study was to assess the degree to which capital sentencing 
under the guided discretion sentencing standards required by Furman v. Georgia (1972) 
has produced predictable, consistent and racially invariant death sentencing patterns.  It 
was not intended to assess the degree to which racial bias might already have influenced 
the progress of a case to the life-death decision, but was limited to the penalty stage, 
where Furman applies, in order to look at possible racial influences on the sentencing 
process itself.  Thus, to the extent race entered into the decisions which resulted in the 
racial composition of the sample reaching the penalty stage, it is not measured or 
considered here.  It is possible, however, that any cumulative racial bias injected into the 
process during earlier discretionary decisions arguably makes racial variance discovered 
at the sentencing stage a conservative reflection of race in the capital justice system 
overall.   
To isolate the sentencing decision in order to look at racial disparities or the lack 
of them, it was logical to compare sentencing outcomes among Black-White race specific 
cases, defendant-victim racial combination cases and all cases as the product of the 
application of the only legally-relevant sentencing criteria under Furman, the statutorily 
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 expressed aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The aggravators presumably 
encompass all criteria which make a crime death worthy, and the mitigators allow broad 
consideration of factors which might offset the crime and justify a life sentence in his 
particular case.  The goal was to determine whether jury sentencing discretion under 
Furman has been sufficiently channeled to avoid or minimize to insignificant levels the 
influence of extra-legal considerations such as racial prejudice.  
The study looked at the sentencing decisions of 632 capital juries in North 
Carolina between May 1990 and December 2002 after they applied North Carolina’s 
Furman-compliant capital sentencing statute (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes).  
By controlling for defendant and victim race and the numeric range of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances accepted and applied by the jury – and also the effect of each 
factor individually -- it was possible to observe the degree to which these factors affected 
the risk of defendants receiving a death sentence for comparable crimes during the 
selected time-frame, and the degree to which these effects differed by race.  To be 
conservative, only results at an alpha level of less than .05 are reported, indicating a 
confidence level of more than 95%.  
In other words, the study tried to determine if the North Carolina death sentencing 
statute has operated to produce the consistent and predictable results which Furman held 
the Eighth Amendment to require, and if it does so in a race-neutral way.  A 
demonstrated, statistically significant lack of racial invariance in how a Furman-
compliant sentencing statute works when operating in a presumptively race-neutral 
setting, should call into question the continued validity of the current, Furman-based 
death sentencing model.   
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 Constitutional principles of racial equity, jury impartiality, arbitrariness of 
punishment, require a death sentencing process which if not completely even-handed is 
sufficiently consistent and predictable to leave no room for doubt as to its fundamental 
fairness between the races.  Statistically significant racial disparities in how facially race-
neutral sentencing standards are applied, regardless of how relatively even the unadjusted 
life-death sentencing rates may be distributed between Black and White defendants, are 
indicative of the operation of racial bias in the system which should be just as 
unacceptable under the law as the stark Black-White disparities seen pre-Furman.  
However, significant bias observed at this point in the societal integration curve is 
probably not the result of institutionally purposeful denial of equal protection under the 
law; it is more likely the result of the continued effect of lingering unconscious, culture-
based racial stereotypes.  The issue is whether any statistically significant racial disparity, 
intended or not, is an acceptable outcome in the operation of our laws where death is the 
consequence. 
Key Findings 
The results of the study support a conclusion that the Furman-based criteria North 
Carolina has adopted to guide the capital sentencing decision have substantially reduced 
unpredictability in death sentencing in that state.  The results do not support a conclusion 
that Furman has worked to eliminate or even reduce race-based arbitrariness to 
constitutionally insignificant levels in capital sentencing in North Carolina.  These are the 
key findings of the study:   
1. The North Carolina statute is moderately efficient in producing consistent and 
predictable capital sentencing results across all cases. 
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 2. The North Carolina statute is highly efficient in producing consistent and 
predictable capital sentencing results for Black defendants, particularly as to 
death sentences. 
3. The North Carolina statute is not efficient in producing consistent and 
predictable capital sentencing results for White defendants. 
4. Black defendants pay a significantly higher premium in terms of the risk of a 
death sentence for increases in the level of aggravation a jury accepts. 
5.  Black defendants pay a significantly higher premium in terms of the risk of a 
death sentence where the murder for pecuniary gain, HAC, and prior violent 
felony record aggravators are accepted. 
6. Black defendants pay the highest premium in terms of the risk of a death 
sentence where their victim was White.   
7. The race of the victim makes no statistically significant difference in the risk 
of receiving the death penalty, except where the defendant is Black and the 
victim is White.    
8. Jury acceptance and application of aggravating circumstances has a much 
stronger influence on sentencing outcomes, regardless of defendant or victim 
race, than jury acceptance and application of mitigating circumstances. 
9. There is no statistically significant race-based difference in the effect of an 
increase in the mitigation level of a case. 
10. There is no statistically significant difference in the mitigatory effect of 
individual factors based on victim race. 
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 11. Only two mitigatory factors were significantly different based on defendant 
race:  The lack of a significant prior record decreases the risk of a death 
sentence more for White defendants versus Black defendants; and jury 
acceptance that the defendant acted under duress favors Black defendants. 
These results indicate that while the North Carolina statute appears to working 
efficiently overall, there is a statistically significant bias against Black defendants in 
terms of how aggravating circumstances affect their risk of a death sentence, regardless 
of the race of their victim, over White defendants whose crimes are comparably 
aggravated. Where levels of aggravation and mitigation are controlled for, Black 
defendants are three (3) times more likely to receive the death penalty than White 
defendants.  When looking at the individual aggravators accepted, the odds multipliers 
increase significantly for Black defendants over White, with HAC – the most subjective 
aggravator – having a very significantly larger effect for Black defendants, and an 
enormous effect if the victim was white, compared to White defendants who kill white 
victims in a heinous, atrocious or cruel way.  These disparities are statistically significant 
at p < .05, but whether they are enough to demonstrate constitutional significance is 
unknown.   
The analysis shows little, if any, disparity in how the North Carolina statute was 
applied which can be attributed to the race of the victim.  The only statistically significant 
difference possibly attributable to a race-of-victim effect was the enhanced aggravation 
effect on Black defendants whose victims were White over the effect on White 
defendants whose victims were White, but this appears more of a race-of-defendant effect 
than a race of victim effect because:  1) there was no statistically significant difference 
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 between the way jury-accepted aggravators and mitigators affected a defendant’s 
sentencing outcome based on the victim’s race, except between White and  Black 
defendants whose victims were White; and 2) there was no statistically significant 
difference in how the aggravators influenced sentencing outcomes for Black defendants, 
period – regardless of the race of their victim.   
The comparison of the White defendant-White victim and Black defendant–White 
victim models produced the largest disparities, thus confirming the fears about Black-on-
White murders expressed in Turner and McClesky.  The Black defendant who killed a 
White victim was at the highest risk overall, with an odds multiplier 3.5 times higher 
[9.883] as for a White defendant who killed a White victim [2.782].  Where the victim 
was White and the HAC aggravator was accepted, a Black defendants’ risk of a death 
sentence was 18.5 times higher than White defendants in the same situation, and if the 
prior violent felony aggravator was present the risk was 69 times higher for Black 
defendants than White.  McCleskey did not find a 4 point disparity in the race-of-victim 
effect sufficient to raise Eighth Amendment concerns as to McCleskey’s individual 
sentence.  Whether the disparities shown in the study presented here are or are not 
constitutionally significant as showing unacceptable jury bias, arbitrary and capricious 
sentencing or a violation of substantive due process requirements of racial parity in death 
sentencing in either an individual or systemic context, is unknown, but the statistical 
significance and the consistency of these disparities raise a question of whether the death 
sentence can ever be fair in a Black-on-White crime. 
The model fit values underscore the apparent race-of-defendant disparity in how 
the Furman standards have been applied in North Carolina.  The all-case model indicates 
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 that the North Carolina sentencing statute is working moderately well overall, with jury 
acceptance and application of the aggravating and mitigating factors to crimes within 
comparable aggravation and mitigation ranges explaining 41% of variance in sentencing 
outcomes, rising to 52% when parsed into individual aggravator and mitigator effects.  
The defendant race-specific models increase the fit for Black defendants over the all-
cases models to 45% of the variance in outcome based on aggravation/mitigation levels 
and 63% in the individual factor models, compared to a slight decrease in fit from the all-
cases model for White defendants to 39% but an increase over the all-cases model where 
individual factors were used to 59%.   
The victim race-specific aggravation/mitigation level models are not far apart in 
their fit – the Black victim model explained about 40% of the variance and the White 
victim model 42% of the variance.  When individual factors are used, however, the fit 
becomes slightly better for Black victim cases than White, explaining 61% of the 
variance in Black victim cases, and 57% in White victim cases.  The racial combination 
models reported at Tables 2 and 5 also demonstrate higher model efficiency for Black 
defendants than White.  The fit for the level of aggravation/mitigation models decreases 
from the all-cases model in the White-on-White sub-sample indicating only 38% of the 
variance in sentencing outcomes is explained; evidence that aggravation/mitigation levels 
operate less efficiently in predicting sentencing outcomes for White defendants.   
Where individual factors are used, however, the model fit increases to nearly 60% 
(R2=.598) The fit increases for Black defendants, regardless of the race of the victim, 
across all models, reaching the best fit in the Black defendant-White victim cases where 
the aggravation/mitigation level model explains 52% of the variance, and the individual 
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 factor model explains almost 80% (R2=.795).  This is a much higher level of predictive 
efficiency than the 50% value rejected in McCleskey. 
Implications of Findings, Limitations of Study, and Need for Additional Research 
 The primary implication of these findings is that it does not appear that the 
Furman approach has eliminated race-based arbitrariness under the Eighth Amendment, 
at least as to the operation of death sentencing procedures in North Carolina.  The 
statistically significant differences in how juries have applied the North Carolina statute 
to Black and White defendants cannot reasonably be attributed completely to non-racial 
factors, and may reasonably be accepted as evidence of arbitrariness founded in 
unconscious juror racial bias which somehow works in favor of White defendants and 
against Black defendants.   
The statute is much less efficient in predicting death sentences for White 
defendants than for Black.  Whether this is the product of unconscious juror bias in 
weighing the seriousness of the aggravating factors when the defendant is Black, or 
unconscious bias as to the mitigatory effects favoring White defendants can’t be 
determined.  What can be said is that there appears to be inequity, probably race-based, in 
how the North Carolina juries apply the North Carolina sentencing statutes to Black 
defendants. 
Whether the racial disparities observed in this study reach the level of 
constitutional significance referenced in McCleskey remains to be seen, but seem 
sufficiently significant to warrant further research to determine whether there is a basis 
for an Eighth Amendment challenge to the North Carolina statute.  Moreover, if it is 
assumed that these results are caused by the unconscious racial attitudes of jurors 
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 impossible to detect or eliminate through procedural safeguards and curable only by time, 
then the Sixth Amendment issue is raised:  What if it is impossible to select a racially 
impartial jury in North Carolina because of lingering cultural racial biases?  How much, 
if any, demonstrated racial disparity in jury decisionmaking equals ‘impartiality’ 
violative of the Sixth Amendment?  The results here thus also support a Sixth 
Amendment challenge to the North Carolina sentencing statute. 
Finally, if it is impossible to eliminate racial disparity in the imposition of the 
death penalty -- or at least reduce it to insignificant levels -- because it is the product of 
unconscious social/cultural attitudes, a substantive due process issue is raised.  Is it an 
infringement on liberty interests to allow the happenstance of a person’s race to influence 
in any significant way whether he lives or dies, regardless of his crime?  There would 
seem to be a substantive liberty interest, arising out of constitutional guarantees of due 
process, to be free from significant racial discrimination period, in the operation of law, 
as much as there is to be free from purposeful racial discrimination, certainly where the 
result is death.   Thus this study provides a possible basis for a claim of denial of 
substantive due process to Black defendants sentenced to death in North Carolina. 
It must be stressed again, however, that a statistical analysis such as the one 
presented here is likely not to be found acceptable to prove a claim requiring specific or 
implied intent to discriminate, as is necessary in an individual equal protection claim 
seeking individual relief like the McCleskey case.  An analysis such as this could be used 
to seek blanket relief from further operation of a specific statute, including enjoining 
further executions based on sentences produced from the challenged statute.  
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 Further research is needed.  The study is limited, intentionally, to the Furman-
Gregg factors as applied in North Carolina and does not take into account the possible 
influence of other case characteristics such as urban-rural effects, type of attorney, 
specific victim vulnerability factors such as age, gender or disability which could also 
account for the unexplained variance.  It is possible that an analysis of aggravator and 
mitigator submission-rejection patterns could bolster or call into question the conclusion 
that racial bias is influencing sentencing outcomes.  Small sub-set sample sizes may also 
have confounded the effects.  Finally, without another state’s sentencing outcome data to 
compare, it is not possible to conclude from this study that the Furman approach has not 
reduced racial inequity in capital sentencing anywhere, because the study is limited to 
North Carolina’s statute and North Carolina sentencing outcomes.  The results raise a red 
flag, however, and the study offers a valid approach to legal arguments about the lack of 
racial invariance in death sentencing under Furman v. Georgia. 
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